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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the period
of time during which a covered employee must be
paid begins when the worker engages in a principal
activity. Donning and doffing safety gear (including
protective clothing) required by the employer is a
principal activity when it is an integral and indispen
sable part of the activities for which the worker is
employed. Such requirements are common in manu
facturing firms. However, under section 203(o) of the
Act an employer need not compensate a worker for
time spent in “changing clothes” (even if it is a prin
cipal activity) if that time is expressly excluded from
compensable time under a bona fide collective bar
gaining agreement applicable to that worker.
The interrelated questions presented are:
(1) What constitutes “changing clothes” with
in the meaning of section 203(o)?
(2) If a worker’s actions are a principal ac
tivity but fall within the scope of the section
203(o) exemption, do those actions nonethe
less commence the period of time during
which (aside from the clothes-changing time)
the worker must be compensated?
(3) If a worker engages in a principal ac
tivity which is not exempted by section
203(o), but which involves only a de minimis
amount of time, does the activity nonetheless
commence the period of time during which
the worker must be compensated?

PARTIES
The petitioners are approximately eight hundred
current or former employees at the United States
Steel’s Gary (Indiana) Works and several other
plants, who brought or joined this action asserting
that their employer failed to compensate them for all
the hours they worked, as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
The respondent is the United States Steel Corpo
ration.
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Petitioners Clifton Sandifer, et al., respectfully
pray that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to re
view the judgment and opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals entered on May 8, 2012.
-------------- ♦-------------OPINIONS BELOW
The May 8, 2012 opinion of the Court of Appeals,
which is reported at 678 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2012), is
set out at pp. la-20a of the Appendix. The June 11,
2012 order of the Court of Appeals denying rehearing
en banc, which is not reported, is set out at p. 82a of
the Appendix. The January 5, 2010 Opinion and
Order of the District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana, which is unofficially reported at 2010 WL
61971 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2010), is set out at pp. 21a33a of the Appendix. The October 15, 2009 Opinion
and Order of the District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana, which is unofficially reported at
2009 WL 3430222 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2009), is set out
at pp. 34a-81a of the Appendix.
--------------------- ♦ ----------------------

JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered
on May 8, 2012. A timely petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc was denied on June 11, 2012. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
AND REGULATION INVOLVED
Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), provides:
In determining for the purposes of sections
206 and 207 o f this title the hours for which
an employee is employed, there shall be ex
cluded any time spent in changing clothes or
washing at the beginning or end of each
workday which was excluded from measured
working time during the week involved by
the express terms of or by custom or practice
under a bona fide collective-bargaining agree
ment applicable to the particular employee.
Section 254(a) of 29 U.S.C., section 4 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, no employer shall be subject to any
liability or punishment under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938...on account of the
failure of such employer to pay an employee
minimum wages, or to pay an employee over
time compensation, for or on account of any
of the following activities of such employee
engaged in on or after May 14, 1947 (1) Walking, riding, or traveling to and
from the actual place of performance of
the principal activity or activities which
such employee is employed to perform,
and
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(2) activities which are preliminary to
or postliminary to said principal activity
or activities,
\

which occur either prior to the time on which
any particular workday at which such em
ployee commences, or subsequent to the time
on any particular workday at which he ceases,
such principal activity or activities.
Section 790.8(c) of 29 C.F.R. provides in pertinent
part:
Among the activities included as an integral
part of a principal activity are those closely
related activities which are indispensable to
its performance. If an employee in a chemical
plant, for example, cannot perform his prin
cipal activities without putting on certain
clothes [footnote], changing clothes on the
employer’s premises at the beginning and
end of the workday would be an integral part
of the employee’s principal activity. On the
other hand, if changing clothes is merely a
convenience to the employee and not directly
related to his principal activities, it would
be considered as a “preliminary” or “post
liminary” activity rather than a principal
part of the activity.
(footnote omitted). The footnote (numbered 65), in
serted following the phrase “certain clothes,” provides
in pertinent part:
Such a situation may exist where the chang
ing of clothes on the employer’s premises is

4

required by law, by rules of the employer, or
by the nature of the work.
-------------------- ♦--------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In many industries workers are required to wear
various forms of safety gear. Those requirements
frequently derive from the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. The lower courts are divided regarding
how the time required to put on and take off the re
quired safety items affects the workers’ right to com
pensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. This
case presents the three inter-related circuit conflicts
that have arisen involving this problem.
(1)
This case arose primarily at the Gary Works
of the United States Steel Corporation; several of the
plaintiffs work at other U.S.Steel plants in Michigan
or Illinois. The Gary Works is the largest integrated
steel mill in North America. The plant occupies some
4,000 acres and employs approximately 5,000 workers,
of whom 4,500 are production and maintenance
workers represented by the United Steelworkers of
America. The union workers enter the plant through
one of seven assigned gates, go to one of several
locker rooms where they put on safety gear, and then
proceed to their work stations; at the end of the day
the workers travel back to their assigned washroom
and remove the safety gear, which remains at the
plant. Because of the size of the plant, some workers
travel to and from their work stations on buses.

5

The time which individual workers spent don
ning and doffing the safety gear, and traveling from
the locker rooms to their work stations, is significant,
and can total several hours per week. The amount
of time varies significantly from worker to worker.
U.S.Steel only pays the workers, however, for the
time that they are at their work stations.
This action concerns whether under the Fair
Labor Standards Act the workers are entitled to be
paid as well for the time they spend putting on and
taking off (“donning and doffing”) their safety equip
ment (the donning and doffing claim) and the time
they spend traveling between the locker rooms and
their work stations (the travel-time claim). Because
the workers spend 40 hours a week at their work
stations, the donning and doffing time and the travel
time — if compensable - would be overtime. (App.
38a).
The safety gear, all of which is worn on the
person, includes three distinct types of items. First,
there are three things that resemble ordinary cloth
ing, but have special safety-related elements: fire
retardant jackets, fire retardant pants, and meta
tarsal (steel toed) boots. Second, the workers wear
protective items that would not usually be described
as clothes and that are generally available and uti
lized in a wide variety of other circumstances: protec
tive goggles, ear plugs, and hard hats. Third, the
workers put on several types of safety gear that do
not resemble ordinary clothing and that have been
specially fashioned for the particular dangers of the
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Gary Works steel plant: (1) a flame retardant or
aluminized “snood,” a head covering similar to the
flash hood worn by Navy and Coast Guard gun crews,
designed to protect the head and neck from flames
and molten metal,1 (2) a flame-retardant “wristlet,”
which covers the forearm from the elbow to the hand,
and is designed to protect the wrist from flames or
molten metal, and (3) flame-retardant spats, designed
to prevent molten-metal from falling into the boots.
(App. 4a-6a, 37a-38a). Most workers wear all of this
equipment.
(2)
Sandifer and several other employees at the
Gary Works brought this action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act in federal district court. Ultimately ap
proximately 800 other current or former Gary Works
employees joined in the collective action against
United States Steel. The plaintiffs sought compensa
tion for two types o f time during which they had been
at the Works but were not compensated: the time
donning and doffing the safety gear and the time
traveling between the locker rooms and their work
stations.
United States Steel moved for summary judg
ment. The District Court granted summary judgment
dismissing the donning and doffing claim, but refused
to dismiss the travel-time claim.
1
There is a woman’s bag-like device of the same name used
to hold one’s hair. A hair “snood” rhymes with “food”; the safety
item in this case rhymes with “good.”
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The donning and doffing claim turns on the
meaning of section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). Putting on and taking off
required safety equipment would, at least ordinarily,
be activities for which a worker would be entitled to
compensation under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c).
Section 203(o), however, states that where an appli
cable collective bargaining agreement so provides an
employer need not compensate a worker for time
spent “changing clothes.” The collective bargaining
agreement applicable to the plaintiffs in this case
did not include compensation for the period when the
workers don and doff the safety equipment. The con
trolling legal question is whether the donning and
doffing of that safety equipment constitutes “chang
ing clothes.” The District Court held that all the
safety equipment at issue constitutes “clothes” within
the meaning of section 203(o). (App. 44a-50a). The
court also concluded that the phrase “changing
clothes” in section 203(o) is not limited to substituting
one item for another (e.g., changing shoes), but also
included putting on additional items (e.g., putting on
wristlets, snoods).2(App. 50a-52a).
The travel-time claim turned on the inter
relationship between section 203(o) and section
254(a), which provides that a worker must be com
pensated for time spent traveling between “principal

2
The plaintiffs asserted that they put on the flame retard
ant jacket and pants over their street clothes.
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activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The district court
concluded that the time spent donning and doffing
the safety gear could constitute a “principal activity,”
so that the time spent traveling from the locker room
to the individual work stations (and back) would be
time traveling between principal activities. (App. 62a64a). U.S.Steel argued, however, that if the donning
and doffing was non-compensable under section
203(o), it necessarily followed that the travel time
too must be non-compensable. The District Court
rejected that contention. (App. 62a-64a).
On appeal3 the Seventh Circuit upheld the dis
missal of the donning and doffing claim and con
cluded that the travel-time claim should also have
been dismissed.
The Court of Appeals held that special protective
safety clothes, even if “different in kind from typical
clothing,” is still clothing within the meaning of sec
tion 203(o), expressly rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to the contrary in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. IBP, Inc v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). (App.

3
The District Court certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) an
interlocutory appeal by U.S.Steel regarding the travel-time is
sue. The Seventh Circuit on appeal also reviewed the District
Court’s determination regarding the donning and doffing issue,
because plaintiffs’ argument that the donning and doffing was
not “changing clothes” under section 203(o) provided an alterna
tive basis for affirming the District Court decision regarding the
travel-time claim. (App. 3a).
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10a) (quoting Alvarez). It also concluded, however,
that not all of the safety gear in this case was
“clothes” within the meaning of section 203(o). Under
that provision, the appellate court held, “clothes” is
limited to items that are “clothing in the ordinary
sense,” something that would generally be “regarded
as an article of clothing.” (App. 6a). Under that inter
pretation of section 203(o), the court of appeals con
cluded, the glasses and ear plugs (and perhaps the
hard hat) were not clothes. The Seventh Circuit
nonetheless held that the donning and doffing claim
was properly dismissed, reasoning that time required
to put on and take off the non-clothes items was de
minimis and thus not compensable under the FLSA.
(Id.).

The Seventh Circuit rejected the travel-time
claim as well, holding that the district judge should
have granted U.S.Steel’s motion for summary judg
ment regarding that claim. It agreed that in the
absence of section 203(o) the donning and doffing of
the safety gear would have been a “principal activity”
under section 254(a), which would have meant that
the workers were entitled to be paid for the travel
time between the locker rooms (where they put on
and took off the gear) and their work stations. (App.
11a). But, the Court of Appeals held, in a case in
which the donning and doffing is non-compensable
because of section 203(o), the donning and doffing
cannot constitute a “principal activity” under section
254(a). (App. lla-17a). The Seventh Circuit expressly
rejected the contrary holding of the Sixth Circuit in

10
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010).

(App. 17a). In the instant case the Seventh Circuit
itself had held that some of the donning and doffing
(e.g., of the eye glasses and ear plugs) was not cov
ered by section 203(o); it concluded, however, that the
time required for putting on and taking off these non
clothes items was de minimis, and thus not sufficient
to start the work day and render compensable the
travel time at issue.
Plaintiffs filed a timely petition for rehearing en
banc. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on
June 11, 2012. (App. 82a).
-------------------------- 4 ---------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A large number of employers require their work
ers to wear safety gear while on the job. Those re
quirements are particularly important and common
in plants that process raw materials, dangerous
chemicals, or food. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S.
21 (2005). At least ordinarily the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act requires that workers be compensated
for the time (unless de minimis) they spend donning
and doffing such safety gear, as well as for the time
the workers spend traveling from where they don
and doff that gear to their work stations.
Unionized plants, however, are subject to a spe
cial provision which has given rise to widespread liti
gation in and disagreements among the lower courts.
Under section 203(o), if an applicable collective
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bargaining agreement so provides, an employer need
not compensate workers for time spent “changing
clothes.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). The circuit courts are
divided regarding three inter-related issues: (1) when
if at all is donning and doffing safety gear “changing
clothes” within the meaning of section 203(o); (2) if all
of the donning and doffing is non-compensable under
section 203(o), does it nonetheless constitute a “prin
cipal activity” under the FLSA and thus begin the
continuous work day, so that travel time to and from
an employee’s work station must be compensated;
and (3) can donning and doffing, even if it is not
“changing clothes” within the meaning of section
203(o), constitute a principal activity if it requires
only a de minimis amount of time.
This case presents all three circuit conflicts. The
Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledged that “courts
of appeals...have reached varied conclusion on the
issues presented by this appeal” (App. 20a). The Court
of Appeals below clearly recognized that its decision
conflicted with decisions in the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits, and expressed its emphatic disagreements
with those other circuit courts. (App. 9a, 10a, 17a).
Many of the major unionized employers affected
by these issues, including U.S.Steel, have plants in
several different circuits, and thus may be subject to
inconsistent legal standards. Several of the plaintiffs
in this case work at a U.S.Steel plant in Ohio, where
(had they filed suit there rather than joining the
instant case) the Sixth Circuit decision in Franklin
would have resulted in a favorable ruling on their
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travel-time claim. The situation is in some circum
stances compounded by the existence of national
collective bargaining agreements, which may have
differing legal consequences at different plants. These
considerations give added force to the need to resolve
these circuit conflicts.
I.

There Is A n Important Circuit Conflict
Regarding The Scope of The “Changing
Clothes” Provision in Section 203(o) of
The Fair Labor Standards Act

The Seventh Circuit decision in the instant case
exacerbates what was already an entrenched circuit
conflict regarding the meaning of the phrase “chang
ing clothes” in section 203(o). Four circuits hold that
“clothes” includes anything that can be worn on the
person, even “accessories.” The Ninth Circuit has
ruled that “special protective gear different in kind
from typical clothing” is not clothes under section
203(o). Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905. In the instant case
the Seventh Circuit has adopted yet a third interpre
tation of section 203(o).
The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
hold that “clothes” includes anything an individual
“wears,” including any “accessories.” Salazar v.
Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“all the garments and accessories worn by a per
son at any one time”); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619
F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir. 2010); Sepulveda v. Allen
Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2009);
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Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955 (11th Cir.
2007). Thus the Tenth Circuit in Salazar held that

knife scabbards are “clothes” because they are “quite
similar to ordinary...holsters.” 644 F.3d at 1140. In
those circuits the controlling standard is whether a
safety item is something the worker can “wear.” In its
appellate brief U.S.Steel urged the Seventh Circuit to
adopt that construction of section 203(o), under which
all of the safety gear in this case would constitute
“clothes.”4
The Seventh Circuit rejected that broad interpre
tation of section 203(o). The panel insisted “that not
everything a person wears is clothing. We say that a
person ‘wears’ glasses, or a watch,...but this just
shows that ‘wear’ is a word of many meanings.” (App.
7a). Applying this standard, the panel held that
“clothes” does not include earplugs or safety glasses.
(App. 6a). The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits, utilizing a decidedly broader definition of
“clothes,” have held, to the contrary, that safety
glasses and ear plugs are indeed “clothes” under sec
tion 203(o). Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134; Franklin, 619
F.3d at 614; Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 216; Anderson,
488 F.3d at 949; see App. 18a (noting that the Labor
Department’s 2002 interpretation of “clothes” was
“broader” than that adopted by the panel).

4
Reply/Response Brief of Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
United States Steel Corp., pp. 12-22.
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The Ninth Circuit applies a much narrower in
terpretation of section 203(o) “clothes.” In that Cir
cuit this term does not include “specialized protective
gear...different in kind from typical clothing.” 339
F.3d at 905. The Ninth Circuit utilizes a distinction
drawn in OSHA regulations between ordinary cloth
ing (including work clothes) and personal protective
equipment, “materials worn by an individual to pro
vide a barrier against exposure to workplace haz
ards.” Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b).5
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit
holding in Alvarez that if an item is required and
fashioned for safety reasons it necessarily cannot be
“clothes” within the meaning of section 203(o). (App.
6a). Under the Seventh Circuit standard an item is
“clothes” for purposes of section 203(o) if it would be
“regarded as an article of clothing” (App. 6a) by
“[ajlmost any English speaker.” (App. 7a). The fact
that the gear might have been fashioned in some
special manner to serve a safety purpose - for exam
ple, the fact that the pants or jacket are flame retard
ant - does not remove that item from coverage as
“clothes” under the decision below.

5 That regulation provides:
Personal Protective Equipment is specialized clothing
or equipment worn by an employee for protection
against a hazard. General work clothes (e.g., uniforms,
pants, shirts or blouses) not intended to function as
protection against a hazard are not considered to be
personal protective equipment.
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The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Ninth
Circuit had construed section 203(o) differently,
holding in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2003), that the term “clothes” in section 203(o) does
not apply to “special protective gear different in kind
from typical clothing.” 339 F.3d at 905. The Seventh
Circuit commented that its interpretation of “clothes”
did not “accord[] with...the outlier...Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Alvarez.” (App. 10a). The Seventh Cir
cuit acknowledged that the safety gear which the
Ninth Circuit in Alvarez held was not section 203(o)
“clothes” was “similar to those the steelworkers wear”
in the instant case. (Id.). The Court of Appeals was
sharply critical of the Ninth Circuit decision in Alva
rez.

The Ninth Circuit...thought it important that
protective clothing...is “different in kind from
typical clothing,” which the court instanced
by “warm clothing.” [339 F.3d] at 905.... But
that can’t be the end of the analysis. Since
workers very rarely change at work from
street clothes into street clothes, section
203(o) would...be virtually empty if the Ninth
Circuit were right.
(Id.). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Franklin candidly

recognized that its construction
odds with...the Ninth Circuit.”
Eleventh Circuit in Anderson
our conclusion conflicts with
opinion.” 488 F.3d at 958.

of section 203(o) “is at
619 F.3d at 615. The
“[acknowledged that
the Ninth Circuit’s
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In arriving at its interpretation of section 203(o),
the Seventh Circuit insisted that that provision is not
governed by the principle that exemptions from the
Fair Labor Standards Act are to be narrowly con
strued. (App. 8a-9a). Section 203(o), the Court of
Appeals insisted, is not an “exemption” at all. The
Seventh Circuit expressly acknowledged that there is
a circuit split regarding whether or not section 203(o)
creates an “exemption” from the FLSA, and is thus
subject to the narrow construction rule.
Section 203(o) creates an exclusion rather
than an exemption, as all but one appellate
decision to address the issue has held. See
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130,
1138 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin v. Kellogg
Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2010);
Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th
Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d
945, 957-58 (11th Cir. 2007).
The outlier is Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., supra,
339 F.3d at 905....
(App. 9a). The Seventh Circuit was harshly critical of
the contrary Ninth Circuit’s Alvarez in this regard.
“[T]he Ninth Circuit seemed to have forgotten that
subsection (o) of section 203 is not found in the sec
tion of the FLSA that creates exemptions.” (App. 10a).
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II.

There Is An Important Circuit Conflict Re
garding Whether Section 203(o) Exempt
Donning and Doffing Can Constitute A “Prin
cipal Activity” Under Section 254(a) and
Thus Start The Beginning of A Work Day

The lower courts are also divided regarding whether
section 203(o) affects whether “changing clothes”
within the scope of that provision can mark the be
ginning (and end) of a work day, thus entitling the
employee to compensation for the period that follows.
Under section 254(a), a worker is entitled to com
pensation for time spent “walking, riding, or traveling
to and from the actual place of performance of the
principal activity or activities which such employee is
employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). Any
action required of a worker is a “principal activity” if
it is an “integral and indispensable part of the princi
pal activities” for which the employee is employed.
Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1956). Once
a worker has engaged in a principal activity, all sub
sequent walking and other travel is outside the scope
of section 254(a)(1) until the end of the work day,
similarly delineated by the occurrence of the last
“principal activity.” In the instant case the plaintiffs
contended that donning and doffing the safety gear
constituted a principal activity under section 254(a)(1),
thus entitling the plaintiffs to compensation for time
that they thereafter spent traveling to and from their
work stations.
The Seventh Circuit agreed that donning and
doffing required safety equipment (at least but for
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section 203(o)) would be a principal activity. “If an
employer requires his employees to don and doff work
clothes at the workplace, then donning and doffing
are an integral and indispensable part of the workers’
main activity...and therefore a principal activity.”
(App. 12a). Absent section 203(o), the lower court
agreed, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to
compensation for their travel time. The Court of Ap
peals acknowledged that “[h]ad the clothes-changing
time in this case not been rendered noncompensable
pursuant to section 203(o), it would have been a
principal activity.” (App. 11a).
The panel held, however, that donning and
doffing that would otherwise constitute a principal
activity is not a principal activity under section
254(a)(1) if it is noncompensable under section 203(o).
(App. lla-18a). The panel reasoned that because
section 203(o) controls whether a worker is “em
ployed” under section 206 and 207, it logically must
also determine whether the worker is engaged in a
principal activity under section 254(a)(1).
[T]he employer and the union decided...that
changing time is not work time and need not
be compensated. If it is not work time...how
can it be one of the “principal...activities
which [the] employee is employed to per
form”? [H]e is not employed to...change
clothes.
(App. lla-12a; see id. 13a (“[s]ection 203(o) permits
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to
reclassify changing time as nonworking time”)).
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The Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledged that
its interpretation of the interrelationship between
sections 203(o) and 254(a) had been expressly rejected
by the Sixth Circuit.
In Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 61819 (6th Cir. 2010), as in this case, the em
ployer, invoking section 203(o), did not pay
its workers for time spent changing into
work clothes. The court concluded neverthe
less that changing time, because required by
the employer, was a “principal activity.”
(App. 17a). “[B]y disagreeing with Franklin we...cre
ate an inter-circuit conflict.” (Id.). The Court of Ap
peals was sharply critical of the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Franklin. “This seems clearly wrong...and
the Franklin opinion offers only a conclusion, not
reasons.” (Id.).
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in Franklin noted
that “ ‘[t]he courts have taken divergent views’ on the
issue of whether activities deemed excluded under
§ 203(o) may still constitute ‘principal activities.’ ” 619
F.3d at 618. That circuit reasoned that “Section 203(o)
relates to the compensability of time spent donning
[and] doffing.... It does not render such time any more
or less integral or indispensable to an employee’s
job.” Id. (quoting Andrako v. U.S.Steel Corp., 632
F.Supp.2d 398, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (emphasis in orig
inal)).
This conflict is of great importance to the practi
cal consequences of section 203(o). If, as the several
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courts of appeals have held, the donning and doffing
of safety gear is within the scope of section 203(o),
workers who put on such items at large plants will
often if not ordinarily travel for a significant period of
time to reach their work station.
III. The Decision of The Seventh Circuit Con
flicts With The Decision of The First Cir
cuit in Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., and The
Decision of This Court in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
The Seventh Circuit correctly acknowledged that
the donning and doffing of required safety gear, if
outside the scope o f section 203(o), would constitute a
principal activity and therefore entitle a worker to
compensation for travel time that occurred after he or
she put on, and until he or she took off, such items.
The Court of Appeals also held that at least some of
the safety equipment in the instant case did not con
stitute “clothing” within the scope of section 203(o).
The court below nonetheless held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to compensation for travel time
after they donned, and before they doffed, those non
clothes items.
That holding is inconsistent with this Court’s
decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, and with the First
Circuit decision in Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003), which in this Court was consol
idated and decided with Alvarez. In Turn the workers
at a poultry processing plant were required to put on
certain safety equipment (including, as in the instant
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case, safety glasses and ear plugs6) at the beginning
of the work day. The district court concluded that
donning and doffing that equipment was a principal
activity, but at trial the jury concluded that the
donning and doffing were non-compensable because
the amount of time involved was de minimis. 546
U.S. at 39. This Court nonetheless held that workers
were entitled to compensation for the walking time
that followed the donning (or picking up of) that
equipment. 546 U.S. at 527.
The question of whether a de minimis principal
activity could trigger the start of the work day —thus
rendering compensable any subsequent travel - was
expressly before this Court in Alvarez. In the earlier
First Circuit proceedings, Chief Judge Boudin, in a
concurring opinion, had argued that the donning of
required equipment ought not constitute a principal
activity, thus rendering compensable subsequent walk
ing time, if the time required to put on that equip
ment was de minimis. Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360
F.3d 274, 285-86 (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc) (concurring
opinion). The government successfully argued in this
Court that “th[e] de minimis rule...has nothing to do
with whether an activity begins or ends the workday
for purposes of the Portal Act.”7As the United States

6 See Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
7 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, No. 04-66,
p. 25, available at 2005 WL 1185927. This issue was also ad
dressed in the Brief for Petitioner, pp. 41-46, available at 2005
(Continued on following page)
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pointed out in that brief, under the terms of the
Department of Labor regulations principal activity
involving “any amount of time” will begin the work
day under the Portal-to-Portal Act. See 29 C.F.R.
790.8(b) n.63. The Department of Labor filed this
brief during the Bush administration, and its position
on this issue has not varied.
The Seventh Circuit expressed disapproval for
the very idea that a worker could be entitled to com
pensation for time traveling from a locker to his or
her place on the production line. “Employers could
emasculate...the ‘primary activity’ provision by plac
ing the locker rooms in the work stations, for then
there would be no post-primary-activity travel time....
What sense would that make?” (App. 14a) (emphasis
in original). “There is something amiss with an
interpretation that implies that the location of the
locker room...determines one’s statutory entitlement
to compensation.” (Id.). This very objection, however,
was made by one o f the lower court opinions in Turn,8
and was unsuccessfully advanced in this Court by
both employers.9

W L 1185926, and the Brief of the National Chicken Council as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 22-25, available at 2005 WL 1841384.
8 Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 280 (majority
opinion), 285 (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc);
Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
9 Brief for Respondent, No. 04-66, pp. 40-41, available at
2005 WL 1841383; Brief for Petitioner, No. 03-1238, pp. 32-36,
available at 2005 W L 1185925.
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IV. The Decision of The Seventh Circuit Is
Clearly Incorrect
(1)

The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in
Alvarez that the “clothes” referred to in section 203(o)
do not include safety gear intended to protect the
wearer from some unusual workplace hazard.
In ordinary parlance “clothes” refers to items
people put on to deal with the common needs and
interests of dressing on a day to day basis: assuring
modesty, providing protection from normal variations
in temperature, creating a particular appearance,
and responding to the likely degree of dirt or precipi
tation to be encountered. In that sense people change
clothes because they are going out to dinner, because
they are going to garden, or because the temperature
has gotten hotter or colder. Similarly, an employee
might change clothes to create a particular appear
ance (e.g., a police officer’s uniform) or to work in a
dirty environment without soiling one’s street clothes
(e.g., a garage mechanic’s coverall). This use of
“changing clothes” is far different from putting on
special protective gear like a hazmat suit, a beehive
keepers suit, or a deep sea diver’s suit. It would, at
the least, be odd to describe those events as “changing
clothes.”
The Ninth Circuit decision establishes a work
able rule, declining to treat safety gear as clothes if
they are intended to guard against some workplace
hazard unlike the problems of ordinary life. The ma
jority rule, insisting on treating as clothes anything
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that a worker can “wear,” implausibly includes all
sorts of things no one would describe as clothes, such
as glasses, earplugs, respirators, or even hazmat
suits. The Seventh Circuit rule, though less extreme,
entails intractable problems of interpretation. In this
case, for example, a court would have to decide
whether ordinary English speakers would label as
clothes such things as a “snood” or “wristlet” - devices
so novel that the employer had to invent names for
them - and to decide when the safety modifications of
a particular item had gone so far that it would no
longer be described as clothes in ordinary conversa
tion. In the poultry industry, for example, aprons and
gloves are made of the modern equivalent of chain
mail. The Ninth Circuit rule in Alvarez avoids these
difficulties.
In addition, much of the safety gear that would
be treated as “clothes” under the majority and Sev
enth Circuit standards is put on over, or added to,
street clothes. In the instant case plaintiffs contend
that is true of all the items in question except the
boots. Because o f the different manner in which
safety gear is used, the lower courts which treat these
items as “clothes” have been forced to hold that
putting on an additional item — rather than, for
example, substituting work pants for street pants is changing clothes. Thus in most circuits putting in
ear plugs is “changing clothes,” and in the Seventh
Circuit putting on a “snood” is “changing clothes.”
That conclusion is clearly inconsistent with ordinary
usage.
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(2)
Whether donning and doffing fall within the
scope of section 203(o) is irrelevant to whether those
actions constitute principal activities under section
254(a).
Section 203(o) expressly states that a collec
tive bargaining agreement that changing clothes (or
washing) is not to be compensated is controlling “[i]n
determining for the purposes of section 206 and 207
of this title the hours for which an employee is em
ployed.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). Section 203(o) by its own
terms simply does not apply or even refer to determi
nations under section 254(a)(1) as to whether an
employee is engaged in a principal activity. When
Congress wanted to permit the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to control whether a worker’s
actions could constitute a “principal activity” for pur
poses of section 254(a)(1), it did so expressly. Con
gress included just such a provision in section 254(a),
but it is limited to the use of a collective bargaining
agreement to determine whether a worker engages in
a principal activity when, on the way to or from work
in an employer owned vehicle, he or she does some
“incidental” work.
For the purposes of this subsection, the use of

an employer’s vehicle for travel by an em
ployee and activities performed by an em
ployee which are incidental to the use of such
vehicle for commuting shall not be consid
ered part of the employee’s principal activi
ties if the use of such vehicle for travel is
within the normal commuting area for the
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employer’s business or establishment and
the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to
an agreement on the part of the employer
and the employee or representative of such
employee.
29 U.S.C. § 254 (emphasis added).
The panel also reasoned that the amendments to
the FLSA gave labor and management negotiators
blanket authority to “determine[]...what is compen
sable work in borderline cases,” such as the question
of whether “walking from a locker room to a work
station [is] ‘work.’ ” (App. 15a). But neither the FLSA,
the Portal-to-Portal Act, nor any other amendment to
the FLSA gives to labor and management negotiators
any such general authority to decide - in place of the
federal courts that ordinarily are responsible for ap
plying federal statutes and regulations — what con
stitutes compensable work in “borderline cases.”
The FLSA and its amendments permit an employer’s
FLSA responsibilities to be affected by a collective
bargaining agreement only in limited and highly
specific circumstances. In addition to sections 203(o)
and 254(a), seven other narrowly framed provisions of
the FLSA provide that an employer’s responsibilities
may be reduced, or expanded, by an agreement with
an authorized union.10 But none of these provisions
10
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m) (exclusion of board and lodging from
wage), 207(b)(1) (exemption from overtime requirement), 207(b)(2)
(same), 207(e)(7) (calculation of regular rate), 207(f) (exemption
from overtime requirement), 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (compensatory time
(Continued on following page)
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includes the compensability of travel time within an
employer’s premises as one of the issues that can be
affected by a collective bargaining agreement. (And in
no instance does the applicability of any such pro
vision turn on whether the matter affected involved
a “borderline” issue). The very specificity of these
limited provisions makes it emphatically clear that
Congress did not intend collective bargaining agree
ments to alter in any other circumstances a worker’s
entitlement to compensation. The Congress which
enacted section 203(o) expressly rejected a proposal to
give management and labor negotiators general
authority to bargain away rights otherwise granted
by the FLSA.11
(3)

The decision of the Court of Appeals that the

de minimis donning and doffing of non-clothes items

outside the scope of section 203(o) does not entitle
workers to compensation for travel time that occurs
between the donning and doffing is squarely contrary
to this Court’s decision in Alvarez.
----------------- ♦-----------------

in lieu of overtime), 254(b) (compensation not otherwise required
by Portal-to-Portal Act).
11
That legislative history is described in the Department of
Labor 2010 Opinion Letter, 2010 WL 12468195.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:07-cv-00443-RLM-PRC Robert L. Miller, Jr. Judge
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Before

Po sn er ,

15, 2012 -

Flaum,

D ecid ed M ay 8,

2012

and

Circuit

M a n io n ,

Judges.

These appeals arise out of
a class action (technically a “collective action,” as it is
brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), a part of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et
seq., rather than pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) on
P o sn e r , Circuit Judge.
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behalf of 800 former and current hourly workers at
U.S. Steel’s steel works in Gary, Indiana. The plain
tiffs argue that U.S. Steel has violated the Act by
failing to compensate them for the time they spend in
putting on and taking off their work clothes in a
locker room at the plant (“clothes-changing time”)
and in walking from the locker room to their work
stations, and back again at the end of the day (“travel
time”). The collective bargaining agreement between
U.S. Steel and the steelworkers union does not re
quire compensation for such time, and apparently
none of the previous collective bargaining agreements
between U.S. Steel and the union since 1947, nine
years after the FLSA was enacted, required it either.
But the plaintiffs argue that the Act itself requires
compensation; and if it does, it overrides any contrary
contractual provision. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740-41 (1981).
The district judge ruled that the Fair Labor
Standards Act does not require that the clotheschanging time in this case be compensated, but that
the Act may require that the travel time be compen
sated and he therefore refused to dismiss the suit.
But he certified the issue of the compensability of the
travel time for an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) by U.S. Steel, and we accepted the
appeal.
The plaintiffs have cross-appealed. They want to
challenge the district judge’s ruling that clotheschanging time is not compensable. U.S. Steel points
out that the cross-appeal doesn’t satisfy the procedural
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standard for an appeal under section 1292(b) because
the plaintiffs did not ask either the district judge or
us for leave to appeal. So we hereby dismiss the crossappeal. But the dismissal has no practical signifi
cance. For if the ruling on clothes-changing time was
erroneous, the plaintiffs’ case for compensation for
travel time is, as we’ll see, irrefutable. And so they
can certainly argue, in opposition to the appeal, that
the ruling was indeed erroneous.
So on to the merits —and it will simplify exposi
tion to start with the clothing issue. The Fair Labor
Standards Act requires that workers be paid at least
the federal minimum wage for all hours worked, and
time and a half for hours worked over 40 hours in a
week. But the statute does not define “work,” a criti
cal hole that the courts must fill —critical because the
Act covers an immense variety of kinds of workplace,
and by expanding the meaning of “work” courts could
overrule agreements negotiated between labor and
management and create unforeseen retroactive
liabilities. To cut back on Supreme Court decisions
believed to have done this, Congress in 1947 passed
the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251 et seq., and
two years later, in the spirit of that Act, added section
3(o) to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(o). That section excludes, from the time during
which an employee is entitled to be compensated at
the minimum hourly wage (or, if it is overtime work,
at 150 percent of his hourly wage), “any time spent in
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end
of each workday which was excluded from measured
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working time . . . by the express terms of or by custom
or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining
agreement applicable to the particular employee.” Id.
(“Washing time” is not at issue in this case, however.)
The plaintiffs argue that the section is inapplicable
because what the district court deemed “clothes” are
not clothes within the meaning of the Act, but rather
safety equipment. The statute does not define
“clothes.”
The alleged clothes consist of flame-retardant
pants and jacket, work gloves, metatarsal boots (work
boots containing steel or other strong material to pro
tect the toes and instep), a hard hat, safety glasses,
ear plugs, and a “snood” (a hood that covers the top of
the head, the chin, and the neck). These work clothes
are in the record, and since a picture is worth a
thousand words, here is a photograph of a man mod
eling the clothes:
[Picture Appears On Opposite Page]
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The glasses and ear plugs are not clothing in the
ordinary sense but the hard hat might be regarded as
an article of clothing, and in any event putting on the
glasses and the hard hat and putting in the ear plugs
is a matter of seconds and hence not compensable,
because de minimis. “Split-second absurdities are not
justified by the actualities of working conditions or by
the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only
when an employee is required to give up a substantial
measure of his time and effort that compensable
working time is involved.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946); see also Frank
v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1949);
Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 372-75
(4th Cir. 2011); id. at 376-81 (concurring opinion);
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 903-04 (9th
Cir. 2003), affirmed under the name of IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
The rest of the outfit certainly seems to be cloth
ing, but the plaintiffs argue, no, it’s “personal pro
tective equipment.” Actually it’s both. Protection against sun, cold, wind, blisters, stains, insect bites,
and being spotted by animals that one is hunting - is
a common function of clothing, and an especially
common function of work clothes worn by factory
workers. It would be absurd to exclude all work
clothes that have a protective function from section
203(o), and thus limit the exclusion largely to actors’
costumes and waiters’ and doormen’s uniforms.
Remember that the section covers not only clotheschanging time but also washing-up time, and workers
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who wear work clothes for self-protection in a dan
gerous or noxious work environment are far more
likely to require significant time for washing up after
work than a waiter.
It’s true that not everything a person wears is
clothing. We say that a person “wears” glasses, or a
watch, or his heart on his sleeve, but this just shows
that “wear” is a word of many meanings. Almost any
English speaker would say that the model in our
photo is wearing work clothes. Given the subject
matter of the Fair Labor Standards Act it would be
beyond odd to say that the word “clothes” in section
203(o) excludes work clothes, especially since the
section is about changing into and out of clothes at
the beginning and end of the workday. Not all work
ers wear work clothes, but workers who change at the
beginning and end of the workday are changing into
and out of work clothes, and if they are governed by a
collective bargaining agreement that makes such
changing noncompensable the agreement must apply
to work clothes, for otherwise the noncompensation
provision would have virtually no applications.
The fact that the clothing exclusion is operative
only if it is agreed to in collective bargaining implies,
moreover, that workers are compensated for the time
they spend changing into work clothes, and washing
up and changing back. “Section 203(o) permits unions
and management to trade off the number of compen
sable hours against the wage rate; the workers get
more, per hour, in exchange for agreeing to exclude
some time from the base.” Spoerle v. Kraft Foods
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Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010). The

steelworkers would not have given up their statutory
entitlement to time and a half for overtime, when
changing clothes or traveling to and from their work
stations, without receiving something in return; and
they will get to keep that compensation until the next
collective bargaining agreement goes into effect, in
addition to the back pay they’re demanding, if they
convince us that “clothes” don’t include the work
clothes worn by steelworkers at the Gary plant.
From a worker’s standpoint any time spent on
the factory grounds is time “at work” in the sense of
time away from home or some other place where he
might prefer to be if he weren’t at work. But it is not
time during which he is making steel, and so it is not
time for which the company will willingly pay. If the
workers have a legal right to be paid for that time,
the company will be less willing to pay them a high
wage for the time during which they are making
steel; it will push hard to reduce the hourly wage so
that its overall labor costs do not rise. The steel
industry is international and highly competitive, and
unions temper their wage demands to avoid killing
the goose that lays the golden eggs. They don’t want
the American steel industry to go where so much
American manufacturing has gone in recent years —
abroad. The plaintiffs are adverse to their union, to
the interests of other steelworkers, and to their own
long-term interests.
The plaintiffs cite language from a number of
cases to the effect that “exemptions” from the Fair
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Labor Standards Act are to be construed narrowly.
E.g., Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 33 (1993);
A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493
(1945). We expressed skepticism in Yi u. Sterling
Collision Centers, Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir.
2007), asking rhetorically: “Why should one provision
in a statute take precedence over another?” No mat
ter; section 203(o) does not create an exemption. The
Fair Labor Standards Act has a section entitled
“Exemptions”; it is 29 U.S.C. § 213; the exclusion of
changing time is not in that section.
This is more than a quibble. There’s a difference
between exclusion and exemption, or, equivalently,
between scope and coverage. The FLSA does not
apply to American workers abroad. Or to soldiers. Or
to certain people who volunteer for particular kinds of
charitable work. These exclusions help to define the
scope of the Act. That scope is defined in 29 U.S.C.
§ 203, which is entitled “Definitions” and is where we
find the provision concerning compensation for
clothes-changing time, rather than in section 213,
where instead we find exemptions for certain types of
worker, such as certain agricultural workers. Section
203(o) creates an exclusion rather than an exemption,
as all but one appellate decision to address the issue
has held. See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d
1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin v. Kellogg Co.,
619 F.3d 604, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2010); Allen v. McWane,
Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2010); Anderson v.
Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 957-58 (11th Cir. 2007).
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The outlier is Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d
at 905 (the affirmance of the decision by the Supreme
Court was on other grounds). But as the Anderson
decision points out, 488 F.3d at 957, the Ninth Circuit
seemed to have forgotten that subsection (o) of section
203 is not found in the section of the FLSA that
creates exemptions. The Ninth Circuit also thought it
important that protective clothing (the workers in
question were employed in a meat-packing plant and
were required to wear protective work clothes similar
to those the steelworkers wear, see 339 F.3d at 898
n. 2) is “different in kind from typical clothing,” which
the court instanced by “warm clothing.” Id. at 905.
But this was just to say that work clothes are not
street clothes. That can’t be the end of the analysis.
Since workers very rarely change at work from street
clothes into street clothes, section 203(o) would as we
said be virtually empty if the Ninth Circuit were
right.
So the district judge was correct to rule that,
given the terms of the collective bargaining agree
ment, U.S. Steel doesn’t have to compensate its
workers for the time they spend changing into and
out of their work clothes. We add that the ruling
accords with all but one reported appellate decision,
and again the outlier is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Alvarez. See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, supra, 644
F.3d at 1136-41; Franklin v. Kellogg Co., supra, 619
F.3d at 610-16; Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc.,
591 F.3d 209, 214-18 (4th Cir. 2009); Anderson v.
Cagle’s, Inc., supra, 488 F.3d 945, 955-58 (11th Cir.
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2007); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n. 3
(5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). And in Spoerle u. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., supra, 614 F.3d at 428, we adopted
Sepulveda’s reasoning and conclusion without under
taking a separate analysis.
But the judge’s ruling that the clothes-changing
time isn’t compensable makes his ruling that the
company must compensate the plaintiffs for travel
time puzzling and paradoxical (which is why, as we
said earlier, the plaintiffs were entitled to argue
against the judge’s ruling on clothes-changing time
without having to cross appeal). The Portal-to-Portal
Act exempts from the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act “walking,
riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of
performance of the principal activity or activities
which such employee is employed to perform.” 29
U.S.C. § 254(a). Had the clothes-changing time in this
case not been rendered noncompensable pursuant to
section 203(o), it would have been a principal activity.
But unless changing into and changing out of work
clothes are principal activities even when made non
compensable pursuant to section 203(o), the exemp
tion in section 254(a) applies, and U.S. Steel need not
compensate for travel time.
The judge thought that clothes-changing time
could be a “principal activity” even though the em
ployer and the union had decided, as he agreed they
were entitled to do, that changing time is not work
time and need not be compensated. If it is not work
time - the workers aren’t being paid and their union
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has agreed to their not being paid —how can it be one
of the “principal. . . activities which [the] employee is
employed to perform”? He is required to wear work
clothes, and for that matter he is required to show
up for work. But he is not employed to show up or
employed to change clothes. Not all requirements im
posed on employees constitute employment. An em
ployee may be required to call in when he is sick, but
unless he is on paid sick leave he is not paid for the
time it takes to place the call.
In Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252-53
(1956), the Supreme Court held that the term “prin
cipal activity or activities” included all activities that
are an “integral and indispensable part of the princi
pal activities” for which the employee is employed,
and the Court reaffirmed that ruling in IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, supra, 546 U.S. at 37. If an employer re
quires his employees to don and doff work clothes at
the workplace, then donning and doffing are an
integral and indispensable part of the workers’ main
activity (in this case, making steel) and therefore a
principal activity. Steiner v. Mitchell, supra, 350 U.S.
at 256. Alvarez held that when this is the case the
time the worker spends walking from the locker room
to the worksite is not time walking to and from a
principal activity, but instead time walking between
principal activities, and so is not within the exemp
tion created by the Portal-to-Portal Act, just as if the
worker were a millwright who inspects, repairs,
replaces, installs, adjusts, and maintains mechanical
equipment in different parts of the steel mill and to

13a

do these tasks must walk from one piece of equipment
to another. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, supra, 546 U.S. at
37.
But the Court in Steiner thought it significant
that there was no collective bargaining agreement
that made clothes-changing time noncompensable.
The Court remarked “the clear implication” of section
203(o) “that clothes changing and washing, which are
otherwise a part of the principal activity, may be
expressly excluded from coverage by agreement.”
Steiner v. Mitchell, supra, 350 U.S. at 255 (emphasis
added). That is what happened in this case. Section
203(o) permits the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to reclassify changing time as nonworking
time, and they did so, agreeing that the workday
would not start when the workers changed their
clothes; it would start when they arrived at their
work site. If clothes-changing time is lawfully not
compensated, we can’t see how it could be thought a
principal employment activity, and so section 254(a)
exempts the travel time in this case.
As with clothes-changing time, workers would
not benefit in the long run from a rule that travel
time must be compensated. It would mean that in an
8-hour shift (the hourly workers at the Gary steel
works work 8-hour shifts), the employer would not
obtain eight hours of productive work; he would be
paying the same wage and getting less work in return
(or getting the same work but paying time and half
overtime for the workers’ travel time), and so the
wage would have to fall the next time the collective
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bargaining agreement was renegotiated unless the
laws of economics were repealed. Employers would
also be moved to limit the time they allowed their
workers for travel (which would require more super
visors and cause disputes) and perhaps to reduce
travel time further by moving the locker rooms closer
to the work stations. These measures would spell
higher costs for the employer — higher labor costs.
The higher such costs are, the lower the hourly wage
will be. And so the higher costs would be borne ulti
mately by the workers.
Employers could emasculate the plaintiffs’ inter
pretation of the “primary activity” provision by plac
ing the locker rooms in the work stations, for then
there would be no post-primary-activity travel time.
There is something amiss with an interpretation that
implies that the location of the locker room, rather
than the amount of time involved in walking to one’s
work station, determines one’s statutory entitlement
to compensation. Suppose it is 100 yards from the
plant entrance to the locker room and another 100
yards to the work station. On the plaintiffs’ view,
traversing the second 100 yards is compensable,
though traversing the first 100 yards is not, but if the
locker room were adjacent to the work station none of
the workers’ travel time would be compensable even
though the amount of walking they’d be doing would
be identical. What sense could that make?
It was concern with the disruption of the work
place caused by forcing employers to compensate for
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travel time and clothes-changing time, as the Su
preme Court held they must do in Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., supra, 328 U.S. at 690-92;
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United
Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 163-64 (1945); and
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944), that drove the
enactment of sections 203(o) and 254(a). IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, supra, 546 U.S. at 25-26; Sepulveda v. Allen
Family Foods, Inc., supra, 591 F.3d at 217; Anderson
v. Cagle’s, Inc., supra, 488 F.3d at 957-58; Adams v.
United States, 471 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Thomas v. Howard University Hospital, 39

F.3d 370, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “The FLSA. . . does
not define the terms ‘work’ or ‘workweek.’ The Su
preme Court defined these terms ‘broadly’ in its early
FLSA cases . .. defined them so broadly, in fact, that
Congress found it necessary to amend the statute to
restore some sanctity to private employment con
tracts.” Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., supra,
591 F.3d at 217.
This history provides guidance to the meaning of
“clothes” and “principal activity” by showing that
Congress was trying to eliminate the disruptions that
the Court’s interpretation of the Fair Labor Stand
ards Act had caused, and to allow the determination
of what is compensable work in borderline cases (is
changing into work clothes “work”? is walking from a
locker room to a work station “work”?) to be settled by
negotiation between labor and management. As the
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preamble to the Portal-to-Portal Act states, rather
dramatically,
The Congress finds that the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 . . . has been inter
preted judicially in disregard of longestablished customs, practices, and contracts
between employers and employees, thereby
creating wholly unexpected liabilities, im
mense in amount and retroactive in opera
tion, upon employers with the results that, if
said Act as so interpreted or claims arising
under such interpretations were permitted to
stand, (1) the payment of such liabilities
would bring about financial ruin of many
employers and seriously impair the capital
resources of many others, thereby resulting
in the reduction of industrial operations,
halting of expansion and development, cur
tailing employment, and the earning power
of employees; (2) the credit of many employ
ers would be seriously impaired; (3) there
would be created both an extended and con
tinuous uncertainty on the part of industry,
both employer and employee, as to the finan
cial condition of productive establishments
and a gross inequality of competitive condi
tions between employers and between indus
tries; (4) employees would receive windfall
payments, including liquidated damages,
of sums for activities performed by them
without any expectation of reward beyond
that included in their agreed rates of pay;
(5) there would occur the promotion of in
creasing demands for payment to employees
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for engaging in activities no compensation
for which had been contemplated by either
the employer or employee at the time they
were engaged in; [and] (6) voluntary collec
tive bargaining would be interfered with and
industrial disputes between employees and
employers and between employees and em
ployees would be created. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 251(a).
Only one previous appellate case has decided
whether noncompensable changing time can be work
time for purposes of the travel-time exemption. In
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618-19 (6th Cir.
2010), as in this case, the employer, invoking section
203(o), did not pay its workers for time spent chang
ing into work clothes. The court concluded neverthe
less that changing time, because required by the
employer, was a “principal activity.” This seems
clearly wrong, for the reasons we’ve explained (and
the Franklin opinion offers only a conclusion, not
reasons). But because by disagreeing with Franklin
we would create an inter-circuit conflict, we have
circulated this opinion to the full court in advance of
publication. 7th Cir. R. 40(e). None of the judges in
regular active service voted to hear the case en banc.
(Judge Williams did not participate in the Rule 40(e)
consideration of the matter.)
The Department of Labor has participated as an
amicus curiae in this appeal on the side of the plain
tiffs, and we end by considering what weight we
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should give its views. During the Clinton Administra
tion the Department took a narrow view of the mean
ing of the term “clothes” for purposes of determining
whether time spent in changing in and out of work
clothes could be excluded under section 203(o) from
the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions.
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion Letter, 2001 WL
58864 (Jan. 15, 2001); Opinion Letter, 1997 WL
998048 (Dec. 3, 1997). During the Bush Administra
tion the Department took a broad view - broader
than we take - of what “clothes” means in the FLSA,
and added that clothes-changing time excluded under
section 203(o) could not be a “principal activity” under
the Portal-to-Portal Act. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion
Letter, 2007 WL 2066454 (May 14, 2007); Opinion
Letter, 2002 WL 33941766 (June 6, 2002). After the
change in administrations in 2009 the Department
reverted to the Clinton Administration’s position on
“changing clothes” and also rejected the Bush Admin
istration’s position on “principal activity.” U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2,
2010 WL 2468195 (June 16, 2010). Such oscillation is
a normal phenomenon of American politics. Demo
crats are friendlier to unions than Republicans are,
though we cannot see how a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs in this case would help unions. (No union is
a party to this case or an amicus curiae.)
Naturally the Department of Labor does not
acknowledge that its motive in switching sides was
political; that would be a crass admission in a brief or
in oral argument, and unlikely to carry weight with
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the judges. The Department says instead that it is
right as a matter of law and that the position the
Department took in the Bush years is wrong; it adds
that since it enforces the Fair Labor Standards Act its
(current) position should carry weight with us. But all
the Department does to demonstrate the “rightness”
of its current position is to echo the plaintiffs’ argu
ments. Nowhere in the Department’s brief is there a
reference to any institutional knowledge of labor
markets possessed by the Department’s staff - or to
anything indeed to which the parties might not have
complete access —that might help the court to decide
the case sensibly; and at the oral argument the
Department’s lawyer acknowledged this void. All that
the Department has contributed to our deliberations,
therefore, though it is not quite nothing, is letting us
know that it disagrees with the position taken by the
Bush Department of Labor; for if it were silent, from
which one might infer that it agreed with that posi
tion, it would be inviting U.S. Steel to argue that the
Department of Labor had been consistent, at least
since 2001, and thus across Administrations con
trolled by opposite political parties, in rejecting the
plaintiffs’ position.
It would be a considerable paradox if before 2001
the plaintiffs would win because the President was a
Democrat, between 2001 and 2009 the defendant
would win because the President was a Republican,
and in 2012 the plaintiffs would win because the
President is again a Democrat. That would make a
travesty of the principle of deference to interpretations
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of statutes by the agencies responsible for enforcing
them, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
n. 30 (1987), since that principle is based on a belief
either that agencies have useful knowledge that can
aid a court or that they are delegates of Congress
charged with interpreting and applying their organic
statutes consistently with legislative purpose. We are
not surprised to discover that courts of appeals that
have reached varied conclusions on the issues pre
sented by this appeal have come together in spurning,
as Judge Wilkinson has put it, “the gyrating agency
letters on the subject.” Sepulveda v. Allen Family
Foods, Inc., supra, 591 F.3d at 216 n. 3; see also
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, supra, 644 F.3d at 1139;
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., supra, 619 F.3d at 612-14;
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at 905 n. 9;
contra, Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., supra, 488 F.3d at
956-57.
We resolve the specific issue that we have been
asked to resolve in this interlocutory appeal in favor
of U.S. Steel. On the basis of that resolution, the suit
has no merit and should be dismissed by the district
court.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
CLIFTON SANDIFER, et al.,
Plaintiffs
vs.
UNITED STATES STEEL
CORP.,

CAUSE NO.
2:07-CV-443 RM

Defendant.
OPINION and ORDER
(Filed Jan. 5, 2010)
On October 15, 2009, the court granted in part
and denied in part United States Steel Corporation’s
summary judgment motion. The court granted U.S.
Steel’s request for judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(o), concluding that the plaintiffs’ activities of
changing clothes and showering at the beginning and
end of their shifts were excluded from measured
working time by the express terms of, or by a custom
or practice under, the applicable collective-bargaining
agreement(s); denied U.S. Steel’s request for judg
ment based on the de minimis doctrine and the
grievance and arbitration procedures of the applic
able CBA; and denied U.S. Steel’s request for judg
ment under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) because the court
couldn’t conclude “as a matter of law that the non
compensability of donning, doffing, and showering
activities under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) excludes consider
ation of whether, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 254(a),
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those activities are an integral and indispensable
part of employees’ principal activities.” Upon further
consideration of U.S. Steel’s arguments that donning,
doffing, showering, and laundering personal clothing
aren’t integral and indispensable activities, the court
agreed with U.S. Steel that showering (excluding Coke
plant employees) and laundering of personal clothing
weren’t compensable activities under 29 U.S.C.
§ 254(a), but found that U.S. Steel hadn’t established
that the donning and doffing of protective clothing
isn’t an integral and indispensable part of the em
ployees’ principal activities.
U.S. Steel now asks that the court certify an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The
ruling sought to be appealed relates to the interaction
of 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) and 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) and
whether § 203(o) activities can be principal activities
that begin and end a work day. U.S. Steel also asks
the court to reconsider a portion of its October 15
ruling. The court addresses the requests separately.
I.

M o t io n t o R e c o n s i d e r

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides
that a court may alter or amend an interlocutory
order any time before entry of final judgment. See
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,

460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (“[EJvery order short of a final
decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the
district judge.”). Unlike a motion to reconsider a final
judgment, which must meet the requirements of Fed
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, “a motion to
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reconsider an interlocutory order may be entertained
and granted as justice requires.” Akzo Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp., 909 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 (N.D. Ind.
1995).
Reconsideration of an interlocutory order may be
appropriate when the facts or law on which the
decision was based change significantly after issu
ance of the order, or when the court has misunder
stood a party, made a decision outside the adversarial
issues presented by the parties, or made an error not
of reasoning but of apprehension. Bank of Waunakee
v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191
(7th Cir. 1990). “These grounds represent extraordi
nary circumstances, and the granting of a motion to
reconsider is to be granted only in such extraordinary
circumstances . . . Indeed, the court’s orders are not
mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsidera
tion at a litigant’s pleasure.” United States Securities
and Exch. Comm’n v. National Presto Indus., Inc., No.
02-C-5027, 2004 WL 1093390, at *2 (N.D. 111. Apr. 28,
2004). Motions to reconsider serve a limited function:
“to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale de
Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269
(7th Cir. 1996).
U.S. Steel seeks reconsideration of the court’s
determination that the company waived its collective
bargaining argument relating to the plaintiffs’ walk
ing time claim because, U.S. Steel says, the company
raised the argument in a timely and fair manner
significantly before the filing of U.S. Steel’s reply

24a

brief and the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to
respond to the argument. The court can’t agree.
A review of U.S. Steel’s summary judgment
submissions shows that, contrary to U.S. Steel’s
assertion, the company’s reliance on provisions of the
CBA in support of its argument under 29 U.S.C.
§ 254(a) first appeared in the reply brief. See Deft. S.
Judg. Reply, at 16-17. U.S. Steel claims it “expressly
raised - and set forth in detail - the argument re
garding deference to the parties’ [CBA] with respect
to walking time in its Motion for Leave to Supple
ment its Statement of Material Facts and Appendix of
Record Evidence in Support of its Motion for Sum
mary Judgment.” While U.S. Steel’s claim is true the “Motion for Leave to Supplement” contains that
argument — the argument isn’t contained in either
the “Supplement to Statement of Material Facts” or
the “Supplement to Appendix” filed by U.S. Steel.
U.S. Steel’s “Motion for Leave to Supplement”
(docket # 106) was filed on September 17, 2008 and
granted on September 23 (docket # 108); the com
pany’s “Supplement to Statement of Material Facts”
and “Supplement to Appendix” became docket num
bers 111 and 112, respectively, on September 29. The
arguments U.S. Steel set forth in its “Motion for
Leave to Supplement” were made in support of its
request that it be allowed to supplement the sum
mary judgment record. An opposing party might
expect to respond to the “Motion for Leave to Sup
plement” by agreeing or objecting to U.S. Steel’s
request to file a supplement, but the “Supplement”
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and “Appendix” documents don’t contain any ar
gument relating to consideration or application of
provisions of the 2008 CBA to the company’s argu
ment under the Portal-to-Portal Act, so neither the
opposing party nor the court would have been alerted
that the “Motion for Leave to Supplement” was
intended to be part of the company’s summary judg
ment submission. The arguments U.S. Steel now
relies on weren’t made in support of the company’s
request for summary judgment until the reply brief,
depriving the plaintiffs of an opportunity to respond.
The company’s motion to reconsider is denied.
II.

M o t i o n t o C e r t if y I n t e r l o c u t o r y A p p e a l

U.S. Steel asks the court to certify the following
question for appeal: “Under the FLSA, where it has
been determined that the activities of donning, doff
ing, and washing are not to be included in hours of
employment by operation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), can
such activities, under any circumstances, start or end
the continuous work day under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) of
the Portal-to-Portal Act?”
Interlocutory appeals are governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that
When a district judge, in making in a civil
action an order not otherwise appealable un
der this section, shall be of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an
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immediate appeal from the order may mate
rially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
such order.
Certification under § 1292(b) requires four statutory
criteria be met: (1) there must be a question of law,
(2) it must be controlling', (3) it must be contestable',
and (4) its resolution must promise to speed up the
litigation. Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees of the Univ.
o f Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
in original). “There is also a nonstatutory require
ment: the petition must be filed in the district court
within a reasonable time after the order sought to be
appealed. Unless all these criteria are satisfied, the
district court may not and should not certify its order
to [the appellate court] for an immediate appeal
under section 1292(b).” Id. “Certification is the excep
tion and not the rule.” In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litig., 878 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (N.D.
111. 1995).
(1) Is There A Question of Law?

The phrase “question of law” in § 1292(b) relates
to a “question of the meaning of a statutory or consti
tutional provision, regulation, or common law doc
trine rather than to whether the party opposing
summary judgment [has] raised a genuine issue of
material fact.” Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees, 219
F.3d at 676. The framers of § 1292(b) intended the
term “question of law” to refer to a “ ‘pure’ question of
law rather than merely to an issue that might be free
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from a factual contest. The idea was that if a case
turned on a pure question of law, something the court
of appeals could decide quickly and clearly without
having to study the record, the court should be en
abled to do so without having to wait till the end of
the case.” Ahrenholz u. Board of Trustees, 219 F.3d at
676-677; see also McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC,
381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (section 1292(b)
appeals “were intended, and should be reserved, for
situations in which the court of appeals can rule on a
pure, controlling question of law without having to
delve beyond the surface of the record in order to
determine the facts.”).
U.S. Steel presents a question of statutory inter
pretation relating to the interaction of 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(o) and 29 U.S.C. § 254(a): whether the activities
of changing clothes and washing that are not included
in “the hours for which an employee is employed”
under Section 203(o) can, under any circumstance,
start or end the continuous work day under Section
254(a). A fact-specific decision isn’t necessary and the
question can be decided without further study of the
record, so the question presented qualifies as a “ques
tion of law” for purposes of § 1292(b).
(2) Is the Question of Law Controlling?

“A ‘controlling question’ can exist where resolu
tion of the question will resolve the litigation in its
entirety or where it will establish whether a particu
lar claim exists.” DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca,
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Mar. 20, 2009). In other words, resolution of a control
ling question of law must affect the course of the
litigation.
The plaintiffs and the defendant agree that this
issue’s resolution would establish whether the case
would proceed to trial. Were U.S. Steel to prevail on
appeal, no trial would be necessary and the litigation
would be resolved in its entirety. Thus, the question
of law is controlling.
(3) Is the Question of Law Contestable1
?

The third statutory criterion is whether the
question of law is contestable, that is, whether “sub
stantial grounds for a difference of opinion” on the
issue exist. City o f Joliet v. Mid-City Nat’l Bank, No.
05-C-6746, 2008 WL 4889038, at *2 (N.D. 111. June 13,
2008). “[A] court faced with a motion for certification
must analyze the strength of the arguments in oppo
sition to the challenged ruling to decide whether the
issue is truly one on which there is a substantial
ground for dispute.” Williams u. Saxon Mortgage Co.,
No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2007 WL 4105126, at *2 (S.D. Ala.
Nov. 15, 2007) (quoting APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2003))); see
also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods.
Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909-910 (S.D. Ind.

2002) (certification is appropriate where “other courts
have adopted conflicting positions regarding the issue
of law proposed for certification”).
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This court considered U.S. Steel’s summary
judgment arguments on this issue and found that it
couldn’t conclude “as a matter of law that the non
compensability of donning, doffing, and showering
activities under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) excludes consider
ation of whether, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 254(a),
those activities are an integral and indispensable
part of employees’ principal activities at USS.” Op.
and Ord., at 28. Some courts have reached a similar
conclusion. See Andrako v. United States Steel Corp.,
632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (court was
“not convinced that § 203(o) changes the ‘principal’
nature of donning and doffing activities, or that
‘principal’ activities somehow become ‘preliminary’ or
‘postliminary’ under the Portal Act simply because
they are rendered noncompensable by a collectivebargaining agreement in accordance with § 203(o)” );
Gatewood v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 569
F. Supp. 2d 687, 702 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“Although the
act of ‘changing clothes’ itself is barred based on
§ 203(o) . . . , the activities that occur after changing
into sanitary gear and before changing out of sanitary
gear are not impacted by the defense. If the jury
determined that donning and doffing this gear was
integral and indispensable, their commencement
would trigger the ‘continuous workday rule,’ and
might make the walking and waiting time at issue
compensable.”); Johnson v. Koch Foods, Inc., No. 2:07CV-51, 2009 WL 3817447, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13,
2009) (“if the donning, doffing, and washing excluded
by § 203(o) are determined by the trier of fact to be
integral and indispensable, those activities could
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commence the workday”); and Figas v. Horsehead
Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at *20 (W.D.
Pa. Sept. 3, 2008) (“[T]he Court is convinced that
activities rendered noncompensable under § 203(o) by
a collective-bargaining agreement can nevertheless
mark the beginning and the end of a continuous
workday for purposes of the Portal Act, and that
§ 203(o) should be read to exclude only ‘time spent in
changing clothes or washing.’ ”). Other courts, as well
as the Department of Labor, have concluded to the
contrary, holding that activities covered by Section
203(o) - activities excluded' from “hours worked” can’t be considered principal activities and don’t start
the workday. See Hudson v. Butterball, LLC, No. 085071-CV-SW-RED, 2009 WL 3486780, at *4 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 14, 2009) (“Because time Hudson spent sanitiz
ing, donning, and doffing is excluded from hours
worked under § 203(o), the walking time did not
follow or precede a principal work activity, and there
fore is not compensable.”); Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590
F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1011 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (“once an
activity has been deemed a section 3(o) activity, it
cannot be considered a principal activity”); Depart
ment of Labor Opinion Letter FLSA 2007-10, 2007
WL 2066454, at *1 (May 14, 2007) (“[Activities
covered by section 3(o) cannot be considered principal
activities and do not start the workday.”).
In deciding the issue of the interaction between
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(o) and 254(a), the court carefully
considered, contrasted, and compared the cases just
cited and the many reasons cited for those decisions.
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Grounds exist for a difference of opinion on the issue
and the arguments in opposition to the challenged
ruling aren’t insubstantial. Accord Andrako v. United
States Steel Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412 (W.D.
Pa. 2009) (“This question - whether Section 203(o)
renders otherwise principal activities simply non
compensable or both non-compensable and non
principal —is a difficult one and one that has divided
the few authorities that have addressed it.”). The
question of law presented here is not settled by
controlling authority and, as evidenced by the differ
ing conclusions cited above, is contestable.
(4) Will Resolution of the Question of Law
Speed Up the Litigation1
?

“This is not a difficult requirement to under
stand. It means that resolution of a controlling legal
question would serve to avoid a trial or otherwise
substantially shorten the litigation.” McFarlin v.
Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004).
The class certification issue still pends. According
to U.S. Steel, without interlocutory appeal, the par
ties will be required to brief the certification issue,
and if the class is certified, provide notice to potential
class members, undertake additional discovery, and
likely file further dispositive motions. Ultimately, a
trial on the merits might be required. “In stark con
trast, if the court of appeals were to reverse on the
question of law on which U.S. Steel seeks certification,
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the case would be over. Thus, there potentially is
substantial saving of time of the district court and of
expense to the litigants.” Deft. Memo., at 12 n. 5.
“Interlocutory appeal is favored where reversal
would substantially alter the course of the district
court proceedings or relieve the parties of significant
burdens. . . . Immediate resolution of this issue has
the potential to materially advance this litigation
because it will potentially save judicial resources and
litigant expense.” West Tennessee Chapter of Associ
ated Builders and Contractors, Inc. u. City of Mem
phis, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1026 (W.D. Tenn. 2000).

The fourth requirement is met.
(5) Is the Motion Timely1
?

While the statute doesn’t contain a time limita
tion, U.S. Steel’s filing of its motion eleven days after
the issuance of the order sought to be appealed meets
the non-statutory requirement that the request be
filed within a “reasonable time.”
III.

C o n c l u s io n

The court grants in part and denies in part the
defendants’ motion [docket # 159]: the request for
reconsideration is DENIED and the request for
certification of interlocutory appeal is GRANTED.
The question the court believes meets the crite
ria for interlocutory review is the following: “Under
the FLSA, where it has been determined that the
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activities of donning, doffing, and washing are not to
be included in hours of employment by operation of
29 U.S.C. § 203(o), can such activities, under any
circumstances, start or end the continuous work day
under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)?”
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

January 5. 2010
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr._____
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
CLIFTON SANDIFER, et al.,

)
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. vs.
UNITED STATES
STEEL CORP.,

)
)
)
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CAUSE NO.
2:07-CV-443 RM

\

OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiffs, current or past employees at United
States Steel’s Gary Works, allege that they work or
have worked numerous pre-shift, post-shift, and other
hours in excess of forty hours per week for which they
haven’t been paid overtime compensation, that USS
doesn’t provide them with an itemized statement of
the total hours worked each pay period, and that USS
doesn’t maintain proper records of hours worked by
employees, all in violation of the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The plaintiffs allege
in their complaint [filed December 21, 2007, docket
# 1] that they are entitled to overtime compensation
for a variety of activities performed on and off the
job site. They bring their claims individually and as
part of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
on behalf of other similarly situated individually
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currently or formerly employed by USS.1 The plain
tiffs seek liquidated damages (or, alternatively, inter
est), overtime compensation, attorneys fees, and
costs.
The case is before the court on USS’s summary
judgment motion, in which the company argues that
various provisions of the parties’ labor agreements
and the Fair Labor Standards Act bar the plaintiffs’
claims. A hearing was held on the summary judgment
motion on June 1, 2009. Based on the parties’ oral
arguments and written submissions, the court grants
in part and denies in part the defendant’s motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

Some 5,000 people are employed at USS’s Gary
Works plant where steel is produced and finished.
Five hundred employees work in management or
as nonunion clerical workers. The rest are unionworkers represented by the United Steelworkers of
America: production and maintenance workers in the
Coke and Chemical Division, Iron Producing Division,
Steel Producing North Division, Steel Producing
South Division, and Operations Services Division are
members of Local 1014; production and maintenance
workers in the finishing operations (Hot Rolling
1
Magistrate Judge Cherry stayed briefing on the plaintiffs’
motion to certify class [docket # 32] on March 28, 2008 [docket
# 34] pending the court’s ruling on the defendant’s summary
judgment motion.
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Division, Sheet Products Division, and Tin Products
Division) are members of Local 1066. The plaintiffs
are current or former employees of USS and current
or former members of the Steelworkers Union.
A.

Collective Bargaining Agreements

The USS/USWA collective bargaining agreements
(CBA) applicable to the issues before the court are the
2003 CBA, effective from May 20, 2003 to September
1, 2008, and the 2008 CBA, a four-year contract that
became effective on September 9, 2008. Those CBAs
contain the terms and conditions for the production
and maintenance workers at all of USS’s domestic
steel producing facilities, including the Gary Works.
B. Daily Activities o f Employees

Gary Works plant employees enter the facility
through any of seven entrances located at various
places across the length of the plant. Employees park
their cars in company parking lots, walk to a gate
entrance, enter the premises via a personal swipe
card, and proceed to their assigned work location or
to one of several locker rooms and then to their
assigned work location.
USS employees have access to personal lockers
and locker room facilities at the plant where they can
store their belongings and change into and out of
their work clothes. Coke Plant workers use lockers
that are partitioned so employees’ work and street
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clothes can be stored separately. OSHA regulations
require that items worn in the Coke Plant not be
removed from the locker room area except in a closed
container, so USS contracts for the removal and
laundering of those garments. The locker rooms also
include shower facilities. Employees holding positions
in the Coke Plant are required to shower at the end of
their shift and, under the CBAs, are afforded time to
do so2; employees who aren’t required to shower at
the end of their shift may do so if they choose.
USS provides protective clothing and equipment
(PPE) for all employees. Such items include flameretardant jackets and pants (“greens”), safety glasses,
a hard hat, protective footwear (steel-toed shoes
with metatarsal guards), gloves, hearing protection,
snoods, spats, leggings, and/or wristlets. Protective
gloves and hearing devices generally aren’t donned
before the start of the shift, but are put on once the
employee arrives at the work site. The specific items
of PPE worn by an individual employee depends on
the requirements of an employee’s job assignment.
Other specialized items, such as respirators, aluminized suits, chemical suits, and welders hoods, are
2
USS says the 2003 CBA and local agreements and prac
tices at the Gary Works Plant permitted Coke Plant employees
to leave their work stations fifteen to twenty minutes before the
end of their shifts for wash-up time, provided that the require
ments of the pushing schedule and other production needs had
been met. Kolb Dec., ^1 52 [Deft. App. 21]. The 2008 CBA Letter
Agreement provides Coke Plant employees with twenty minutes
of wash-up time prior to the end of their shift. Deft. App. 392.
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kept and put on as needed at job locations. All of the
PPE items just mentioned are purchased, main
tained, and laundered by USS (or its vendors), are
available for employees’ use only at the plant, and
may not be removed from the plant.
The parties agree that workers must arrive at
the plant before the start of their shift so they can put
on their PPE and arrive at their work stations by the
time the shift officially begins. Paid shifts begin when
the person arrives at the assigned work station to
begin work, and paid shifts end “eight hours later or,
if overtime is worked, when the employee actually
stops working.” [Deft. Stmt, of Material Facts, ^ 24.]
Time employees spend in pre- and post-shift donning,
doffing, walking, showering (with the exception of
Coke plant employees), and laundering personal
clothing - time the plaintiffs say averages nine to ten
hours per week —is unpaid. At issue is whether Gary
Works employees should be compensated for those
pre- and post-shift hours.3

3
The plaintiffs appear to claim in their Supplemental
Citation [docket # 150] addressing the decision in Andrako v.
United States Steel, 632 F. Supp. 2d 398 (W.D. Pa. 2009), that
they have advanced a claim that they were required to attend
pre- and post-shift safety briefings without compensation, but
neither the complaint nor the summary judgment record con
tains any such claim. The plaintiffs state in their summary
judgment response that “[s]upervisors require employees to be
at safety meetings, or at their work station, ready to begin work
at the time their shift begins with all of their PPE donned and
secured.” Stmt, of Genuine Issues of Fact, at 4; Resp., at 8. The
(Continued on following page)
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II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. C i v . P. 56(c).
The court must construe the evidence and all infer
ences that reasonably can be drawn from the evi
dence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, here, the plaintiffs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Summary judgment
for a defendant is appropriate when a plaintiff ‘fails
to make a sufficient showing to establish the exis
tence of an element essential to [his or her] case on
which [he or she] will bear the burden of proof at
trial.’ ” Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887,
892. (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.
Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-806 (1999)). Summary
judgment is not appropriate when “the evidence pre
sents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
plaintiffs can’t use their Supplemental Citation to amend their
complaint or supplement the summary judgment record, cf.
Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t o f Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 758 n.15 (7th
Cir. 2006) (plaintiff’ s claim “could be disregarded because Ms.
Burks did not plead such a claim, nor did she amend her com
plaint to include it”); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776,
781 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A plaintiff may not amend his complaint
through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment.”), so the issue of attending pre- and post
shift safety meetings without compensation isn’t properly before
the court and won’t be addressed.
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to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, A ll U.S. at 251252. The proper inquiry, then, is “whether there is the
need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are
any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at
250. Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up
moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what
evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact
to accept its version of the events.” Springer u.
Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Enacted in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., guarantees “compensation for
all work or employment engaged in by employees
covered by the Act.” Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944). The
FLSA requires employers to pay their employees “a
wage for all of the ‘work’ that they do,” Spoerle v.
Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862
(W.D. Wis. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207), and to
pay them one and a half times their hourly wage for
every hour that they work in excess of forty hours a
week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA doesn’t define
“work,” but that term has been broadly construed to
include “physical or mental exertion (whether burden
some or not) controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit
of the employer and his business.” Tennessee Coal v.
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321 U.S. at 598; see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 790.6(a) & (b) (a “workday” is “roughly described as
the period ‘from whistle to whistle,’ ” which includes
all time within “the period between the commence
ment and completion” of an employee’s principal
activities, regardless of whether employee engages in
work throughout the entire period).

Muscoda,

Certain provisions of the FLSA were amended in
1947 by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251262, which exempts employers from compensating
employees for (1) time spent walking, riding, or trav
eling to and from the actual place of performance of
the principal activity the employee is employed to
perform, and (2) engaging in preliminary or postliminary activities if those actions occur either prior
to the time the employee starts engaging in “principal
activities” or after the employee stops engaging in
“principal activities” on any particular workday. 29
U.S.C. § 254(a). A “principal activity” is “an integral
and indispensable part of the principal activities for
which covered workmen are employed.” Steiner v.
Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 270.8(a) (“[I]n order for an activity to be a ‘principal’
activity, it need not be predominant in some way over
all other activities engaged in by the employee in
performing his job; rather, an employee may, for
purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act, be engaged in
several ‘principal’ activities during the workday. The
‘principal’ activities referred to in the statute are
activities which the employee is ‘employed to per
form.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
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The FLSA was amended again in 1949 by the
addition of Section 3(o), which provides that in de
termining the hours for which an employee is em
ployed, “there shall be excluded any time spent in
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end
of each workday which was excluded from measured
working time during the week involved by the ex
press terms of or by custom or practice under a bona
fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to a
particular employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).
USS maintains its employment practices don’t
violate the FLSA, and the company has moved for
summary judgment on the claims of the plaintiffs’
complaint. USS says the plaintiffs aren’t entitled to
the relief they seek because (I) the additional com
pensation sought is barred by language of the CBAs;
(ii) overtime compensation for donning, doffing, and
washing is barred by 29 U.S.C. § 203(o); (iii) the
activities at issue are activities not compensable
under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a); (iv) time spent donning,
doffing, and washing is de minimis and therefore not
compensable; and (v) plaintiffs didn’t seek relief
through the mandatory grievance and arbitration
procedures of the CBA.
The plaintiffs dispute USS’s summary judgment
arguments. The plaintiffs contend the issue of com
pensation for pre- and post-shift activities isn’t ad
dressed by the express terms of the applicable CBA
and genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
they are entitled to over-time compensation for
reporting to work before their paid shift begins,
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donning and doffing protective clothing and safety
equipment in the company locker rooms before and
after their paid shifts begin and end, traveling to
their assigned work stations within the plant before
their paid shifts begin, traveling from their assigned
work stations to the company locker rooms after their
paid shifts end, showering at the work site after their
paid shifts end, and transporting and laundering
contaminated clothing away from the work place
while off duty.4 The plaintiffs maintain they are
entitled to be paid for time spent on those activities
and USS has engaged in illegal pay practices by not
compensating them for the many hours of pre- and
post-shift work they perform on a daily and weekly
basis.
A. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)
USS says the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
relief they seek based on 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) and the
language of the applicable CBAs. Under Section
203(o), time spent by employees in pre- and post-shift
donning and doffing of PPE and showering is ex
cluded from the computation of hours worked if two
conditions are met: first, the activities at issue
4
In May 2008, the plaintiffs sought to bring an additional
claim for overtime compensation relating to “buddy relief,” but
they didn’t file an amended complaint containing that claim as
directed by Magistrate Judge Cherry in his June 19, 2008 Order
[docket # 91]. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ “buddy relief” claim is
not properly before the court.
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constitute “changing clothes” as that term is used in
the statute, and, second, a bona fide collective bar
gaining agreement excludes, by its express terms or
by a custom or practice under the agreement, time
spent changing clothes and washing from compensa
ble working time. Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
1063, 1065 (D. Minn. 2007). The burden is on USS to
establish that the time spent on those activities
should be excluded from plaintiffs’ compensation. Davis
v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d
1314, 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2004); cf. Roe-Midgett v. CC
Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The
burden is on CCS to establish that an employee
falls within the FLSA’s administrative exemption.”);
Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365,
370 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the employer’s burden to
establish that an employee is exempt from the FLSA’s
overtime requirements.”). USS maintains it can
establish both elements.
1. Changing Clothes
(a) “Clothes”
USS contends the PPE worn by employees at the
Gary Works plant constitutes “clothes” as that term is
used in 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). USS relies on W e b s t e r ’ s
T h ir d N e w I n t e r n a t io n a l D ic t io n a r y 428 (1986),
which defines “clothes” as “clothing,” which, in turn,
is defined as “covering for the human body or gar
ments in general: all the garments and accessories
worn by a person at any one time.” USS maintains
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“[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction is
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be inter
preted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, com
mon meaning.” Alabama Tissue Ctr. of the Univ. of
Alabama Health Serv. Found,., P.C. v. Sullivan, 975
F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992). USS says giving the
word “clothes” its ordinary meaning finds support in
decisions like Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945,
955-956 (11th Cir. 2007); Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487
F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066-1067 (D. Minn. 2007); and
Davis v. Charben Pokphand (USA), Inc., 302
F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321-1322 (M.D. Ala. 2004), and in
the Department of Labor’s construction of § 203(o)
in the agency’s June 6, 2002 Opinion Letter.5 USS
insists that even though courts don’t all agree on the
proper definition for the term “clothes” in this con
text, “the language of Section 203(o) [is] clear and
unambiguous [and] a rational examination of the
items at issue here reveals them to be what they are:
‘clothes.’ ” Deft. Memo., at 12.
The plaintiffs urge the court to find that use of
the phrase “changing clothes” in Section 203(o) “is
most sensibly construed to refer to the act of exchang
ing one set of ordinary clothing for another, such as a

6 In Opinion Letter FLSA 2002-2, the Wage and Hour Di
vision of the DOL interpreted “clothes” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)
to include “items worn on the body for covering, protection, or
sanitation, but not to include tools or other implements such as
knives, scabbards, or meat hooks.” 2002 WL 33941766, p. 3
(June 6, 2002).
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uniform or work clothes,” and thus doesn’t include
their donning and doffing of PPE. Resp., at 29. The
plaintiffs maintain the items of PPE worn by Gary
Works employees aren’t “clothes” as that phrase was
defined in 1957 when Section 203(o) was enacted,
citing to W e b s t e r ’ s S e c o n d N e w I n t e r n a t io n a l D ic 
t io n a r y 507 (1957), which defined “clothes” as “[c]overing for the human body; vestments; venture; a
general term for whatever covering is worn, or is
made to be worn, for decency or comfort.” According
to the plaintiffs, “ [w]hile protective equipment may
cover the human body in a generic sense, such equip
ment is not worn ‘for decency or comfort,’ but rather
as a component of the gear and equipment the worker
must use to safely perform the tasks required of him
by his employer.” Resp., at 27-28.
The plaintiffs rely on the decision in Alvarez v.
IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003), which
viewed § 203(o) as an “exemption” to the FLSA that
was to be construed narrowly against the employer.
The Alvarez court viewed the specialized gear worn
by employees of a meat slaughtering and processing
plant - sanitary outer garments; hard hat; hair net;
ear plugs; face shield or safety goggles; gloves;
liquid-repelling sleeves; aprons; leggings; safety boots/
shoes; weight-lifting type belts; chain-link (mesh)
metal aprons, leggings, vests, sleeves, and gloves;
plexiglass arm guards; Kevlar gloves; and punctureresistant protective sleeves - as “different in kind
from typical clothing” and held that “changing clothes
means something different from donning required

47a

specialized personal protective equipment” 339 F.3d
at 905. The plaintiffs say their PPE isn’t worn for
“decency or comfort” or as substitute clothing.
Recognizing the continuing disagreement about
the proper interpretation of “changing clothes” under
§ 203(o),6 the court finds persuasive the reasoning of
6 Compare Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 632
F. Supp. 2d 398, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (concluding that flame
retardant jackets and pants, glasses, boots, snoods, and hard
hats “unquestionably fall within . . . any common definition of
the word ‘clothes’ ”); Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 302
F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (finding hairnet, ear
plugs, boots, a smock, an apron, cotton gloves, rubber gloves,
cutting gloves, arm guards, and plastic sleeves qualified as
clothes under § 203(o) in reliance on dictionary definition of
“clothing” as “covering for the human body or garments in gen
eral”); Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043,
at *11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that “all
protective gear is outside the category of ‘clothes’ referenced in
§ 203(o)” as “inconsistent with the plain language of the statu
tory provision and the legislative intent reflected therein”); and
Anderson v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Tex.
2001) (donning and doffing aprons, smocks, gloves, boots, hair
net, and earplugs not compensable), with Spoerle v. Kraft Foods
Global Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (concluding
that “clothes” refers only to “something the employee would
normally wear anyway” or a replacement for such clothing and
not “safety and sanitation equipment” that’s “uniquely jobrelated” and “under the employer’s control”); Gonzalez v. Farm
ington Foods, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. 111. 2003) (donning
and doffing of “sanitary and safety equipment,” including a
helmet, white smock, plastic apron, arm guard, belly guard,
plastic arm sleeve, a variety of gloves, a hook, knife holder, a
piece of steel to straighten the edge of a knife blade, and knives
didn’t constitute “changing clothes” under § 203(o)); and Perez v.
Mountaire Farms, Inc., No. AMD 06-121, 2008 W L 2389798 (D.
(Continued on following page)
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Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-959 (11th
Cir. 2007), and Andrako v. United States Steel Corp.,
632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 407-410 (W.D. Pa. 2009), that
the term “clothes” as used - but not defined — in
§ 203(o) should be given its ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning, that is, as “covering for the human
body or garments in general,” as defined in Webster’s
Third N e w International Dictionary 428 (1986)).
Anderson v. Cagle’s, 488 F.3d at 955; Andrako v. USS,
632 F. Supp. 2d at 409. Thus, a determination of
whether an item of protective gear should be consid
ered “clothes” under § 203(o) depends on the exact
nature of the item and. the circumstances under
which it is used. “A cloth jumpsuit, for instance, is
probably clothing even if worn by a car mechanic as
protection from oil and grease; a space suit is prob
ably not clothing, even though it is a kind of protec
tive outfit.” Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063,
1067 (D. Minn. 2007). Regardless of whether an item
is labeled “ ‘personal protective equipment’ or some
thing else, a hair net is still a hair net, pants are still
pants, and a smock is still a smock. Whether the
items that plaintiffs don and doff are ‘clothes’ under
§ 203(o) depends on what those items are, not on
what they are called by the CBA, by [the] plant
manager, or by anyone else.” Kassa v. Kerry, 487

Md. June 10, 2008) (narrowly construing “clothes” as not in
cluding aprons, rain suits, cooler suits, gloves (rubber, chain,
and wizard), arm guards or sleeves, goggles or safety glasses,
boots, hair nets, beard nets, and bump caps).
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F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (emphasis in original); see also
Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir.
2001) (“nonsensical” to define “clothes” so narrowly as
to exclude protective garments (lab coat, hair cover,
facial hair cover, shoe cover) worn at plant).
USS has submitted for the court’s review the
items of PPE the company provides for its employees.
See Kolb Decl., Exh. 4. Unlike the speciality [sic] items
at issue in Alvarez v. IBP, 339 F.3d at 898 n.2, or
those in Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612,
2002 WL 32987224, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002)
(which included plastic aprons, thin knit gloves, cotton
liner gloves, rubber outer gloves, mesh or chain
gloves, dust masks, plastic sleeve covers, and hard
plastic arm guards), the cloth jacket and pants, fabric
snoods, hoods, leggings, and wristlets, and boots here
at issue easily fall within the ordinary definition of
“clothes.” See Andrako v. USS, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 410
(finding same items of USS protective gear to be
“clothing”: “by description, look, feel, purpose, fit, and
basic common sense, the items at issue are ‘clothes’
within any reasonable meaning of Section 203(o)”);
Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL
4170043, at *11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (the term “clothes”
held to include flame-retardant jacket, pants, and/or
coveralls, hard hat, and work shoes: “the adjective
‘protective’ does not deprive ‘clothes’ of their funda
mental character”). And even if the court were to
assume that hard hats, safety glasses, and ear plugs
aren’t “clothes,” but see Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d
1123, 1126 n .l (10th Cir. 1994) (requiring employees
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to put on safety glasses, earplugs, and a hard hat “is
no different from having a baseball player show up in
uniform, a businessperson with a suit and tie, or a
judge with a robe”), the time expended by each em
ployee donning and doffing those items is minimal, or
de minimis, and thus not compensable under the
FLSA. See Kassa v. Kerry, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 n.l
(“Hair nets and beard nets are . . . purely functional
and are not generally considered ‘clothes’ as that term
is ordinarily used. But the precise classification of
hair nets and beard nets is not important [because]
donning and doffing those items alone is surely a de
minimis activity.”).
(b) “Changing”
The plaintiffs further rely on

W e b s t e r ’s S e c o n d

I n t e r n a t io n a l D ic t io n a r y 448 (1957) for a
definition of “changing” - “to alter by substituting
something else for, or by giving up for something else
. . . as, to change one’s clothes, one’s occupation, or
one’s intention; to change cars or trains, partners,
sides, or parties” — and conclude that Gary Works
employees don’t “ ‘change clothes’ . . . when they
insert ear plugs, or put on hard hats, safety glasses,
steel-toed boots, snoods, hoods, leggings, wristlets, or
a pair of work gloves, or don flame retardant protec
tive jackets and pants over their street clothes be
cause such acts do not involv[e] the substituting of
clothing.” Resp., at 28-29. The court can’t agree.
“Nothing in the statute’s language suggests that its
application turns on whether one must fully disrobe

N ew
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or exchange one shirt, for example, for another,”
Anderson v. Cagle’s, 488 F.3d at 956, and the term
“changing” can’t be read so narrowly as to exclude the
actions of the plaintiffs in donning and doffing the
PPE they wear each day. See W e b s t e r ’s II N e w
R iv e r s id e U n iv e r s it y D ic t io n a r y 248 (1984) (defin
ing “change” as: “To make different: alter; to give a
totally different form or appearance to: transform).
Even if each employee did nothing more than put the
items of PPE over the clothing he or she wore to the
plant, adding those items would satisfy the “change”
requirement. See W e b st e r ’s T h ir d N e w In t e r n a t io n a l
D ic t io n a r y 373 (2002) (defining “change” as: “To
make different: to make different in some particular
but short of conversion into something else”).
While the plaintiffs argue for a narrow construc
tion of § 203(o), say the court should follow Alvarez v.
IBP, 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), and reject Anderson
v. Cagle’s, 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007), and claim
the proper definition of “clothes” doesn’t include
protective clothing of any kind, they haven’t applied
their arguments to the specifics of this case. They
haven’t explained why the items of protective cloth
ing they are required to wear aren’t “clothes” or why
their donning and doffing activities don’t amount to
“changing clothes,” nor have they compared or
contrasted their items of protective clothing with
items at issue in other cases. The plaintiffs’ legal
conclusion that protective clothing doesn’t qualify as
clothing under § 203(o) doesn’t provide “the specific
substantiating facts require[d] under Rule 56 to
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create a genuine issue of material fact.” Carter v.
American Oil Co., 139 F.3d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir. 1998).
The court concludes USS has satisfied the first ele
ment under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).
2. Collective Bargaining Agreement/Custom
or Practice
To prevail on its § 203(o) defense, USS must
establish not only that the items at issue in this case
are “clothes” - which it has done - but also that the
applicable CBA contains express terms excluding
compensation for changing clothes and washing or
there is a “custom or practice” under the applicable
CBA of not paying workers for those pre- and post
shift activities. The parties agree that Gary Works
employees aren’t now and have never been compen
sated for time spent donning and doffing protective
gear and showering before their paid shifts begin or
after the shifts end.7
USS maintains the terms of the parties’ collective
bargaining agreements have excluded compensation
for changing clothes and showering since 1947 when
the issue was first memorialized in the parties’ Sup
plemental Agreement, which provides that employees

7
All references to non-payment for “washing” or “shower
ing” time recognizes the exception for Coke Plant employees
who, pursuant to CBA provisions and local agreements and
practices, are afforded wash-up time before the end of their paid
shifts.
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won’t be paid for “time spent in preparatory or closing
activities on the employer’s premises . . . for which
compensation is not paid under present practices.”
Deft. App. 267-268. USS says the referenced “prepar
atory or closing activities” include the donning and
doffing of work clothes and washing up, and the
parties’ re-adoption of the terms of the 1947 Supple
mental Agreement in subsequent CBAs establishes
that the parties intended a custom or practice of non
compensation to continue over the periods of those
contracts, as well.
USS insists the 1947 Supplemental Agreement,
which contains specific terms excluding compensation
for these activities, has governed this issue since
1947. For example, USS says, the 1947 Supplemental
Agreement was re-adopted in the 1999 CBA, which,
in Appendix C, specifically affirmed that “under
standings reflected in the prior Supplemental Agree
ment concerning so-called portal-to-portal claims are
re-adopted” for the term of the agreement. Deft. App.
269-270. USS says the 1947 Supplemental Agreement
was incorporated into the 2003 CBA because that
CBA specifically required new or different practices
or agreements to be in writing and no writing relat
ing to these activities was signed during that time.
Kolb Decl., H37. And, USS says, in 2008, the com
pany and the Union agreed “that starting in 1947,
every national collective bargaining agreement . . .
negotiated by the parties has included an agreement
that [USS] is not obligated to pay employees for
preparatory or closing activities which occur outside
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of their scheduled shift or away from their worksite
(i.e., so-called ‘portal-to-portal activities’) [including]
donning and doffing of protective clothing (including
such items as flame-retardant jacket and pants,
metatarsal boots, hard hats, safety glasses, ear plugs,
and a snood or hood) and washing up.” Deft. App. 392.
USS also says the issue of non-compensation for
the activities at issue has arisen in local bargaining
and grievances over the years, as evidenced by a 1983
grievance filed by Local 1014 at USS’s Gary Works
plant based on the following claim: “At the present
time we pick our time cards up at the gate, get on a
bus, go to washhouse, change clothes and then go to
line up area. We don’t get paid until we get lined up.”
The grievance requested that USS “[p]ay portal to
portal from gates.” Deft. App. 271. USS says the
union’s request was denied. Kolb Decl., *1138. USS
says the issue of washing or showering time has been
addressed by the parties over the years, as well, as
evidenced by grievances filed by the union in 1974,
1977, 1980, 1983, and 1993 on behalf of employees in
various departments of the Gary Works plant re
questing that they be paid for time spent washingup/
showering at the end of their shifts. See Deft. App.
290-311. USS concludes that changing clothes and
showering “are not now, and have never been, consid
ered compensable time at any point at Gary Works.”
Kolb Decl., f 37.8

8
Mr. Kolb notes that local practices in the Coke Plant
providing employees with wash-up time were allowed to
(Continued on following page)
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Plaintiffs respond that the terms of the 1947
Supplemental Agreement aren’t found in the 2003
CBA and can’t be inferred as being applicable to the
2003 contract because, according to plaintiff Clifton
Sandifer, the 2003 CBA “declared that its express
terms constituted the ‘full and complete understand
ing’ between the parties. Sandifer Decl., ^ 26. Mr.
Sandifer’s statement contains no reference or citation
to the portion of the CBA upon which he relies. See
Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“We will not scour a record to locate evi
dence supporting a party’s legal argument.”).
Plaintiffs next claim that USS “essentially con
cedes” that no agreement regarding these issues
existed from 2003 to 2008 because the 2003 CBA
didn’t incorporate the 1947 Supplemental Agreement.
Resp., at 32. According to the plaintiffs, USS admit
ted that the 2003 CBA “specifically intended to ter
minate existing local agreements and practices and
require that such agreements and practices be memo
rialized in writing in the future.” Resp., at 31. The
plaintiffs’ claim in this regard finds no support in the
cited section of USS’s argument, see Deft. Memo., at
189, or in plain language of the applicable sections of
continue under the 2003 CBA if the time provided didn’t dimin
ish productivity or interfere with the demands of the production
schedule. Kolb Decl., *11 52.
9
USS presented the following argument on this point: “In
2003, the [Union] and [USS] entered into the current [CBA],
which, while not expressly referring to the 1947 Supplemental
Agreement, made it clear that the decades-old custom and
(Continued on following page)
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the 2003 CBA. Section 5.A.6 of the 2003 CBA requires
that “all future Local Working Conditions” —that is,
those arising from 2003 forward - “be reduced to
writing.” Deft. App. 89. USS says the custom or
practice here at issue has existed since 1947, so in
2003 the custom or practice wasn’t a “future” local
working condition that was required to be in writing.
The 2003 CBA also provides in Section 5.A.7 that
“any Local Working Condition established prior to
May 20, 2003 that would interfere with the attain
ment of the workplace restructuring objective” would
be eliminated and those local working conditions
unaffected by the workplace restructuring plan “will
be preserved.” The plaintiffs haven’t alleged or ar
gued that the local working condition of non-payment
for changing clothes and showering was eliminated
because it interfered with USS’s Workplace Restruc
turing and Productivity Plan or that that local work
ing condition wasn’t preserved over the effective
period of the contract.
Plaintiffs say, too, that it isn’t enough that
an employer has a custom or practice of not paying
practice of not paying for preparatory and closing activities that
occur outside of the paid shift would remain in effect. In fact, the
parties to the 2003 [CBA] went even further and provided that
any then existing local agreement or practice that could dimin
ish productivity would be terminated and that any new local
agreement, custom or practice to the contrary had to be in
writing, signed and approved at the national level. No such
written agreement has been signed by the parties.” Deft. Memo.,
at 18.

57a

for time spent on the activities here at issue: use of
the phrase “a custom or practice under a bona fide
collective-bargaining agreement” in Section 203(o)
requires the custom or practice to have a relationship
with or arise under the auspices of the CBA. The
plaintiffs contend “[t]he practice need not have been
memorialized within the text of the CBA, but the
issue must at least have arisen as part of the CBA
negotiation process, such that the CBA’s failure to
address the question can fairly be attributed to the
union’s decision to acquiesce to the employer’s prac
tice.” Resp., at 34. Plaintiffs claim that no custom or
practice can exist under the 2003 CBA as evidenced
by plaintiff Clifton Sandifer’s statement that “[t]he
CBA, which governed compensation at the time this
suit was filed, did not address compensation for the
activities at issue in this case. Nor was the issue
discussed during the negotiations leading to that
contract.” Sandifer Decl., ^ 26. Mr. Sandifer, though,
hasn’t set forth any information about his personal
knowledge of the 2003 contract negotiations. He re
ports that from June 2006 to September 2008 he was
Chairman of the Civil Rights Committee and in that
capacity became familiar with the union grievance
process and some of the grievances filed against USS,
but he hasn’t stated that he had any involvement in
the 2003 contracts talks, was a member of the union’s
bargaining committee in 2003, or personally partici
pated in or even attended the 2003 negotiation ses
sions in any capacity. Mr. Sandifer’s unsupported
statement that “the issue” wasn’t discussed during
the 2003 contract negotiations, without more, is
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insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether a custom or practice exists under the
2003 CBA. C f Morrow v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152
F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary
judgment where affidavit claiming that management
knew of offensive photographs in the workplace didn’t
include any specifics about who complained, to whom
the complaints were made, the nature of the com
plaints, or how the affiant gained personal knowledge
of the complaints); Hadley v. County o f DuPage, 715
F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 56 demands
something more specific than the bald assertion of
the general truth of a particular matter, rather it
requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts
establishing the existence of the truth of the matter
asserted.”).
Plaintiffs lastly argue that the five-year span of
the 2003 CBA - from 2003 to 2008 - is too short a
period of time to establish a custom or practice,
claiming that “a custom or practice in the FLSA
context may not be found when a history of discord
exists, as it does here.” Resp., at 36. The plaintiffs cite
language from Tennessee Coal v. Muscoda, 321 U.S.
at 602, that “[a] valid custom cannot be based on so
turbulent and discordant a history; it requires some
thing more than unilateral and arbitrary imposition
of working conditions.” They further claim that the
“issue of compensation for clothes changing need not
be ‘threshed out’ between the union and the employer
—it is enough the employer was unilaterally refusing
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to pay for the activity at the time the CBA was en
tered into.” Resp., at 37. But plaintiffs have offered no
explanation as to the applicability of that language to
the facts of this case nor have they set forth any
evidence demonstrating that the issue at hand wasn’t
“threshed out” between USS and the Union during
contract negotiations and grievance procedures. See
Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2006)
(court is not required to “scour a record to locate
evidence supporting a party’s legal argument” nor
“research and construct the parties’ arguments.”);
Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake County,
IL, 424 F.3d 659, 664 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the

parties’ duty to package, present, and support their
arguments.”).
USS has submitted evidence it says demonstrates
the parties’ continuing agreement to non-compensation
for the activities here at issue - language in the 1947
Supplemental Agreement; inclusion of that agree
ment in the 1999 and 2008 CBAs; language in the
2003 CBA preserving prior local working condition
agreements (like the 1947 Supplemental Agreement)
and requiring new local working condition agree
ments to be in writing (there were none); and a cus
tom or practice of non-payment for these activities.
The plaintiffs haven’t challenged USS’s evidence that
the issue of non-compensation has been addressed
and agreed to between the company and the union
since 1947, nor have the plaintiffs presented evidence
of their own demonstrating a history of what they
refer to as “unilateral and arbitrary” imposition of
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working conditions, i.e., non-compensation for preand post-shift activities of changing clothes and
showering, that would negate the terms of the parties’
written agreements or create a genuine issue as to
whether a custom or practice of non-compensation
has existed in connection with the parties’ bona fide
collective-bargaining agreements since 1947. USS has
carried its burden under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), and the
company’s summary judgment motion is granted with
respect to plaintiffs’ claim for compensation for time
spent donning and doffing PPE and showering.
B. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) - Portal-to-Portal Act

USS next claims the plaintiffs’ claims are barred
under the Portal-to-Portal Act, which exempts em
ployers from paying employees for (1) “walking,
riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of
performance of the principal activity or activities” the
employee was hired to perform and (2) engaging in
activities that are “preliminary to or postliminary to
[the employee’s] principal activity or activities” if
those activities occur either prior to the commence
ment of or subsequent to ceasing of the principal
activity or activities on any particular workday. 29
U.S.C. § 254(a). “Principal activity” isn’t defined in
the statute, but the term has been interpreted as in
cluding all activities that are an “integral and indis
pensable part of the principal activities” for which the
employees are employed. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S.
247, 252-253 (1956). “To be ‘integral and indispens
able,’ an activity must be necessary to the principal
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work performed and done for the benefit of the em
ployer.” Alvarez v. IBP, 339 F.3d at 902-903. “In
contrast to integral and indispensable activities,
preliminary or postliminary activities are activities
spent predominantly in the employees’ own inter
ests.” Jerzak v. City of South Bend, 996 F. Supp. 840,
848 (N.D. Ind. 1998). “The test, therefore, to deter
mine which activities are ‘principal’ and which are ‘an
integral and indispensable part’ of such activities, is
not whether the activities in question are uniquely
related to the predominant activity of the business,
but whether they are performed as part of the regular
work of the employees in the ordinary course of
business.” Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394,
400-401 (5th Cir. 1976); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b)
(“No categorical list o f ‘preliminary’ and ‘postliminary’
activities . . . can be made, since activities which
under one set of circumstances may be ‘preliminary’
or ‘postliminary’ may under other conditions be ‘prin
cipal’ activities.”). USS’s arguments will be addressed
separately.10
10
USS also argued that the plaintiffs’ walking time is non
compensable pursuant to the terms of the applicable CBA, a fact
the company says the court “should weigh - heavily” because the
“Portal-to-Portal Act expressly requires consideration of the
parties’ collective bargaining agreements to determine whether
employers must pay employees for preliminary and/or post
liminary activities.” Reply, at 16. This argument was raised for
the first time in USS’s reply brief, so the company’s argument in
this regard is waived. See United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d
767, 769 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the defendant has waived this argu
ment because he presented it for the first time in his reply
(Continued on following page)
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1. Interaction with 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)
USS’s first argument is that donning and doffing
PPE and showering can’t be considered principal ac
tivities because those activities are non-compensable
under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). USS says changing clothes
and showering aren’t parts of employees’ measured
working time, so the activities don’t start or end the
workday and can’t be considered principal activities.
Thus, USS says, walking to and from the locker
rooms doesn’t occur after the beginning of the first
principal activity of the day or before the end of the
last principal activity, rendering that walking time
non-compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. USS
says its position is supported by the Department of
Labor’s opinion that
In promulgating [§ 203(o)] Congress plainly
excluded activities covered by section [203(o)]
from time that would otherwise be ‘hours
worked.’ Accordingly, activities covered by
section [203(o)] cannot be considered princi
pal activities and do not start the workday.
Walking time after a [§ 203(o)] activity is
therefore not compensable unless it is pre
ceded by a principal activity.
DOL Opinion Letter FLSA 2007-10,
2066454, at *1 (May 14, 2007).

2007

WL

brief”); Hart v. Transit Mgmt. of Racine, Inc., 426 F.3d 863, 867
(7th Cir. 2005) (“Arguments that first appear in a reply brief are
deemed waived.”).
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Courts are to afford consideration to agency
opinion letters interpreting the statutory provisions
within the agency’s area of expertise, see Skidmore u.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[T]he rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the [DOL] under [the
FLSA], while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment as to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”);
CenTra, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast and South
west Areas Pension Fund, 578 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir.
2009) (“Opinion letters are not entitled to Chevron

deference, or even the deference we accord an agen
cy’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation,
. . . but opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect . . . to
the extent that [they] have the power to persuade.’ ”
0quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000)), but, in this instance, the DOL’s 2007
FLSA Opinion Letter provides little guidance on the
reason(s) for the agency’s conclusion on this issue.
The court finds more persuasive the conclusion of
the Figas court that “the character of donning and
doffing activities is not dependent upon whether
such activities are excluded pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement.” Figas v. Horsehead Corp.,
No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at *20 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 3, 2008) (emphasis in original). “Section 203(o)
relates to the compensability of time spent donning,
doffing, and washing in the collective bargaining
process. It does not render such time any more or less
integral or indispensable to an employee’s job.”
Andrako v. USS, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (emphasis in
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original). Accepting USS’s argument and the conclu
sion of the Opinion Letter on this issue would neces
sarily “expand § 203(o)’s exclusion beyond donning,
doffing and washing time to include post-donning and
pre-doffing travel time, which is not mentioned
therein.” Figas v. Horsehead Corp., 2008 WL 4170043,
at *20. The court can’t conclude as a matter of law
that the non-compensability of donning, doffing,
and showering activities under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)
excludes consideration of whether, pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 254(a), those activities are an integral and
indispensable part of employees’ principal activities
at USS. Contra Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590
F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1011 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (concluding
that “once an activity has been deemed a section
[203(o)] activity, it cannot be considered a principal
activity. This finding is in accordance with the 2007
DOL opinion letter, which the court has already
determined worthy of deference, stating that a sec
tion [203(o)] activity is not a principal activity. . . .
Therefore, to avoid the preclusive effect of the combi
nation of section [203(o)] and the continuous workday
rule, plaintiffs must show that their claimed activi
ties are themselves either principal activities or are
integral or indispensable to a principal activity.”).
2. Integral and Indispensable
USS next asserts that the activities here at issue
—donning and doffing, showering, and the laundering
of employees’ personal clothing - aren’t “integral
and indispensable” parts of the employees’ principal
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activities because those activities aren’t necessary to
employees’ performance of their principal activities
and aren’t undertaken for the sole benefit of the
company. The company’s arguments relating to each
activity will be addressed separately.
(a) Donning and Doffing of PPE
USS says that based on differing job assignments
within the plant, not all employees are required to
wear PPE - for example, as a Bander in the Hot Roll
finishing department, plaintiff Alvin Mitchell wasn’t
required to wear greens, although he chose to do so.
See Burton Decl., ^ 3 [App. 339-340]. USS says, too,
that wearing greens isn’t necessary to the perfor
mance of the principal activities of certain jobs —for
example, wearing greens isn’t necessary for plaintiffs
Dora Anderson and Kenny Williams to monitor
temperatures and opacity gauges in their positions as
Heaters in the Coke Plant, even though, USS notes,
wearing greens was required for that position. Deft.
Memo., at 25. USS asserts that even though wearing
PPE at Gary Works unquestionably advances the
company’s core value of maintaining a safe work
environment, “that interest is not for the exclusive
benefit of the employer. Wearing greens clearly serves
the mutual interest of the employer and the employee
to avoid accidents and to work in the safest environ
ment possible.” Deft. Memo., at 26. USS maintains
that donning and doffing of generic work clothes isn’t
an integral and indispensable part of principal activi
ties at the plant because the donning and doffing of
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PPE isn’t necessary to the principal work performed
by employees and isn’t done for the sole benefit of the
company. Donning and doffing, USS concludes, are
preliminary and postliminary activities and, there
fore, walking from the locker rooms to the employees’
place of principal activity and back to the locker room
after employees cease their principal activities is not
compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Plaintiffs respond that donning and doffing PPE
is integral and indispensable to the principal work
activities at the plant: they insist they wear PPE
because doing so is required by USS and OSHA and
the use of PPE “prevents workplace injuries, which
would severely impeded [sic] USS’s business.” Resp.,
at 44. The plaintiffs, though, haven’t challenged USS’s
claim that some job assignments don’t require em
ployees to wear PPE, that wearing PPE isn’t neces
sary for some employees to perform their jobs, or that
the wearing of PPE serves the mutual safety interests
of the company and the employees. Plaintiffs cite
Coke Plant regulations relating to the wearing of
flame-retardant clothing, see Resp., at 38-39 (citing to
“29 CFR § 1910.1029 et al.”), but haven’t referenced
specific USS rules or OHSA regulations that address
the PPE they are required to wear. The plaintiffs cite
generally to USS handbooks and safety manuals - for
example, plaintiffs set forth the booklet explaining
USS’s Personal Protective Equipment Program, which
provides that management personnel must assure
that “affected employees use PPE,” at p. 1 (emphasis
in original), “[ajffected employees shall wear the
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required PPE for the area(s) where they are work
ing,” at p. 2 (emphasis in original), and “[a]fter train
ing, affected employees will be able to independently
determine when and what PPE is necessary in their
normal workplace,” at 3 (emphasis in original), see
Walton Decl., Exh. B - but they haven’t pointed to
specific provisions of those materials that designate
the PPE they are required to wear or explained how
the PPE they wear is necessary to their performance
of their job tasks.
The changing of clothes is integral and indispen
sable to an employee’s principal activities if the
donning is “necessary to the principal work performed
and done for the benefit of the employer.” Alvarez v.
IBP, 339 F.3d at 903; see also Armour & Co. v.
Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (‘Whether time is
spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for
the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the
circumstances of the case.”); Ballaris v. Wacker
Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2004)
(changing clothes may be considered integral and
indispensable “where the changing of clothes on the
employer’s premises is required by law, by rules of
the employer, or by the nature of the work”). The
parties’ evidence establishes that Coke Plant employ
ees are required to wear PPE, and USS has set forth
evidence that at least one plaintiff not working in the
Coke Plant isn’t required to wear PPE and the re
quirement to wear PPE isn’t vital to the performance
of at least one job assignment in the Coke Plant. But
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to
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the plaintiffs as the court is required to do at this
stage of the proceedings, the court concludes that
USS hasn’t established that the donning and doffing
of PPE isn’t an integral and indispensable part of the
principal activities at USS. The court agrees with
USS that the safety advantages associated with the
wearing of PPE is of mutual benefit to the company
and the plaintiffs; however, a reasonable fact-finder
could conclude that the donning and doffing of PPE is
necessary to the principal work performed by the
plaintiffs. The company’s request for summary judg
ment on this issue is denied.
(b) Showering
USS maintains the company has no requirement
that employees working in areas other than the Coke
Plant must shower at the end of their shifts and those
who do shower before leaving the plant do so for their
own convenience. USS says the applicable CBAs
contain a recognition of the shower requirement for
Coke Plant employees and the parties’ agreement
that those employees are to be afforded time to
shower before the end of their paid shifts, but “[e]xcept for employees at the Coke Plant, there is no
requirement whatsoever that any employee wash up
or shower after the end of his shift. While U.S. Steel
does provide and maintain numerous wash houses
and locker rooms throughout the plant, whether an
employee elects to wash up or shower is the employ
ee’s decision and for his own convenience.” Kolb Dec.,
‘U48.
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USS sets forth additional statements by supervi
sory employees relating to showering requirements at
the plant:
- Declaration of Donald G. Ramsey, Jr. that
there is no showering requirement for people
holding position of Stock Unloader on Hi-Line,
including plaintiff Nicole Andrews; Mr. Ramsey
reports he’s been working at USS since 1998 and
is currently a Process Coordinator on the HiLine. See Deft. App. 370-371.
- Declaration of James Lash, who has
worked at USS since 1998, is currently Steel Co
ordinator on No. 1 BOP, and says there’s no re
quirement that Pit Utility employees, like
plaintiff Bernard Jenkins, shower at the end of
their shifts. See Deft. App. 349-353.
- Declaration of Nicholas Furdeck, who be
came employed at USS in 1998, is the current Pit
Coordinator and Interim Area Manager for the
Q-BOP, and says that USS has no requirement
for employees at the Q-BOP, like plaintiff Ber
nard Jenkins, to shower at the end of their shifts.
See Deft. App. 341-347.
- Declaration of Michael Burton, who has
worked at USS since 1999 and was Shift Man
ager at EGL until December 2007 when he became
Shift Manager at South Sheet Metal Warehouse,
and says there’s no requirement that employees
at EGL, like plaintiff Alvin Mitchell, shower at
the end of their shifts. See Deft. App. 339-340.
- Declaration of Gregory Olson that USS
has no requirement that employees working as
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Banders and Diesel Burners, like plaintiff Alvin
Mitchell, shower before they leave the plant; Mr.
Olson reports he began working at USS in 2000
and is currently Shift Manager in Hot Roll Fin
ishing. See Deft. App. 355-358.
—
Declaration of David Best, who began
employment at USS in 1994, is currently Hot
Strip Mill Coordinator, and states that there’s no
requirement that employees, like plaintiff Clifton
Sandifer, who work in the Hot Strip Mill shower
at the end of their shifts. See Deft. App. 334-338.
USS concludes that because showering isn’t required
and inures to the benefit of the employees, that ac
tivity isn’t an integral and indispensable part of em
ployees’ principal activities and is non-compensable
time under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
While plaintiffs claim that showering is “manda
tory” under USS policies and OHSA requirements
and the requirement for them to shower before they
leave the plant benefits the company, they have
produced no evidence to support their claim nor have
they challenged the statements of USS supervisory
personnel that no showering requirement exists out
side the Coke Plant. Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements,
without more, are insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact relating to the issue of shower
ing.
USS has presented evidence sufficient to estab
lish that, with the exception of Coke Plant employees,
showering isn’t otherwise required by the company
and shower facilities are located in the locker rooms
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at the plant for the convenience of the employees.
The court concludes that showering constitutes a
postliminary activity under 29 U.S.C. § 254 for which
USS isn’t required to compensate its employees. USS
is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
(c) Laundering Personal Clothing
USS also asserts that the plaintiffs aren’t enti
tled to be paid for time spent transporting and laun
dering the personal clothing they wear under their
PPE because that time doesn’t qualify as “work” and
so is not compensable under the FLSA. USS says the
plaintiffs’ washing of their personal clothing isn’t
“necessarily and primarily for the benefit” of the
company, USS derives no benefit from employees
wearing clean personal clothing under their PPE, and
USS has no requirement that employees’ personal
clothing be laundered or cleaned.
Because the term “washing” as used in Section
203(o) can’t be seen as including laundering clothes,
see Burks v. Equity Group-Eufaula Div., LLC, 571
F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243-1244 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (noting
that “the vast majority of cases that have specifically
discussed ‘washing’ in the context of § 203(o) have
done so only in the context of washing one’s body” and
“the legislative history of 203(o) indicates that the
term ‘washing’ was intended to be limited to cleaning
the person”); Saunders v. John Morrel & Co., No.
C88-4143, 1991 WL 529542, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 24,
1991) (same), USS is entitled to summary judgment
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only if the plaintiffs’ laundering activity can be ex
cluded from coverage as a “preliminary or post
liminary” activity under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). Thus,
the court must determine whether plaintiffs’ launder
ing of their personal items of clothing is (I) required
by USS, (ii) necessary for the plaintiffs to perform
their duties, and (iii) primarily for the benefit of USS.
Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340,
1344 (11th Cir. 2007); Jerzak v. City of South Bend,
996 F. Supp. 840, 848 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
The plaintiffs claim that their laundering of
personal work clothes is compensable under the
FLSA in reliance on Bull u. United States, 68 Fed. Cl.
212 (Fed. Cl. 2005), where the court held that off-duty
laundering of canine training towels was of benefit to
the employer and integral and indispensable to the
canine handlers’ job duties. Plaintiffs say USS dic
tates the type of clothing they must wear under their
PPE and the methods they must use to launder that
clothing; they say, too, that OSHA regulations, e.g. 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1018, require USS to provide for the
cleaning of chemically contaminated clothing, “includ
ing shoes and underwear.”11 The plaintiffs maintain
11
The plaintiffs cite generally to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018,
which relates to “occupational exposures to inorganic arsenic”
and outlines the obligations of employers in maintaining work
places where such exposure might occur. The plaintiffs haven’t
specified any applicable section(s), but upon examination of the
regulation, the court found the following references to the care
of clothing for employees working in affected areas: employers
are required to provide employees working in regulated areas
(Continued on following page)
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their clothing is regularly contaminated with chemi
cals so USS benefits directly by requiring them to
personally launder that clothing.
Plaintiffs’ laundering claim relates to the per
sonal items of clothing they wear each day.12 The
plaintiffs first say that USS dictates the clothing they
must wear under their PPE, as well as the manner in
which they must launder that clothing, and that
transporting and laundering of those personal items
of clothing “is done under the express direction of
with protective work clothing and equipment; launder that pro
tective clothing “at least weekly,” repair or replace protective
clothing as needed; assure that contaminated protective clothing
is placed in a closed container in the changing rooms; inform any
person who cleans or launders the protective clothing of the
harmful effects of exposure to inorganic arsenic; prohibit the
removal of inorganic arsenic from protective clothing by shaking
or blowing; provide changing rooms with separate storage fa
cilities for street clothes and protective clothing; and provide
facilities for employees to vacuum their protective clothing and
shoes before entering other areas of the workplace. See § 1910.1018(j),
(m). 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 contains no requirement that an
employer affected by this section provide laundering services for
employees’ personal clothing or reimburse employees for laun
dering their personal clothing.
12
While the plaintiffs say USS provides employees with
instructions on how to clean the flame retardant PPE and claim
the company “required employees to launder their contaminated
PPE in a certain manner,” Stmt, of Genuine Issues, U 8, the
record establishes that USS supplies, maintains, and launders
the flame retardant PPE worn by all employees. The plaintiffs
have presented no evidence to support a finding that they are or
were required to launder the flame retardant PPE supplied by
the company.
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USS,” citing to unidentified sections of Exhibits 1-37.
But unlike the situation in Bull v. United States
where the evidence - specific portions of a handbook
and a written memo — established that the canine
training towels were required to be properly cleaned
“after each use,” 68 Fed. Cl. at 238, the plaintiffs’
conclusory statements in Exhibits 1-37, without cita
tion to any evidence that would support their claims,
that they are “required” by USS to transport and
launder their personal clothing, are insufficient to
establish that USS requires its employees to launder
their personal clothing. See Ammons v. Aramark
Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-818 (7th Cir.
2004) (“Citations to an entire transcript of a deposi
tion or to a lengthy exhibit are not specific and are,
accordingly, inappropriate. A court should not be
expected to review a lengthy record for facts that a
party could have easily identified with greater par
ticularity.”). The plaintiffs have provided no support
for their conclusory statement that USS “directly
benefits by requiring plaintiffs to take home and
launder” their personal clothing, and they haven’t
alleged or argued that the transporting and launder
ing of their personal clothing is necessary for them to
perform their duties.
USS provides employees with PPE, flame retard
ant apparel that the company launders and maintains.
The company's Gary Works “Personal Protective Equip
ment Program” manual states that personal clothing
worn beneath the PPE “should be 100% cotton” and
directs that no synthetic material clothing, e.g.,
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nylon, dacron, rayon, polyester, etc., be worn under
the PPE because such material will “burn at lower
temperatures, melt and stick to the skin.” The “Gen
eral Safety and Plant Conduct” manual instructs that
work clothing shouldn’t be laundered or washed “in
flammable liquids, such as gasoline, kerosene, or
similar fluids, as the cloth may retain a part of the
solution and become highly flammable,” and further
advises that flame-retardant clothing “should be
cleaned by washing, using normal wash, rinse and
drying cycles at normal temperatures, and using a
normal household detergent as the cleansing agent,
[and] to avoid impairing the flame-resistant proper
ties, such clothing should never be boiled or steam
cleaned, and solvents or bleaches should never be
used.”
While employees at Gary Works are prohibited
from wearing items of personal clothing that would
“melt and stick to the skin” and are provided with
information about how to safely launder their per
sonal work clothes and any flame-retardant clothing
they might choose to wear under the companyprovided PPE, neither that prohibition nor the ac
companying safety instructions transform the trans
porting and laundering of plaintiffs’ personal clothing
into a requirement of USS that is necessary for the
plaintiffs to perform their duties or that is primarily
for the benefit of USS. USS is entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiffs’ laundering claim.
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C.

Time Expended is De Minimis

USS maintains the time spent by the plaintiffs
donning and doffing PPE and walking to and from
the job site is de minimis and not compensable under
the FLSA. “Because defendant seeks to rely on an
exception to the rule, it is the defendant’s burden to
prove that the exception applies.” Spoerle v. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (W.D.
Wis. 2007).
“The de minimis doctrine permits employers to
disregard, for purposes of the FLSA, otherwise com
pensable work ‘[w]hen the matter in issue concerns
only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the
scheduled working hours. It is only when an em
ployee is required to give up a substantial measure of
his time and effort that compensable working time is
involved.’ ” Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361,
370-371 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946)). De
termination of whether the de minimis exception is
applicable requires the court to examine four factors.
Hoyt v. Ellsworth Co-op. Creamery, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1132, 1138 (W.D. Wis. 2008). The first factor is “the
amount of daily time spent on the additional work;”
the second is “the practical administrative difficulty
of recording the additional time;” the third is “the
aggregate amount of compensable time;” and the final
factor is “the regularity of the additional work.”
“Although many courts have found daily periods of
approximately 10 minutes to be de minimis, no rigid
rule using mathematical certainty should be applied.
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Instead common sense must be applied to the facts
of each case.” Hoyt v. Ellsworth Creamery, 579
F. Supp. 2d at 1138; see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.47 (“In
recording working time under the Act, insubstantial
or insignificant periods of time beyond the scheduled
working hours, which cannot as a practical adminis
trative matter be precisely recorded for payroll pur
poses, may be disregarded. The courts have held that
such trifles are de minimis. . . . This rule applies only
where there are uncertain and indefinite periods of
time involved of a few seconds or minutes duration,
and where the failure to count such time is due to
considerations justified by industrial realities. An
employer may not arbitrarily fail to count as hours
worked any part, however small, of the employee’s
fixed or regular working time or practically ascer
tainable period of time he is regularly required to
spend on duties assigned to him.”).
With respect to the amount of daily time expended,
USS says donning the required PPE takes approxi
mately 2 minutes, 40 seconds, as demonstrated in its
video presentation submitted as Exhibit 1 to Raul
Arana’s Declaration [Deft. App. 323-333]. USS says
while the walking distances from locker rooms to
work locations “vary widely,” estimates are between 1
minute, 38 seconds and 8 minutes. Deft. Memo., at
30. USS notes, too, that walking times are often
reduced when employees are allowed to walk back to
the locker rooms during their paid shifts. Doffing
work clothes is alleged to take even less time than
putting them on. Deft. Memo., at 30.
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USS claims difficulty would arise under the
second factor if the company had to record the addi
tional time. USS contends that “[t]he time employees
spend engaging in all of these pre- and post-shift
activities cannot be administratively tracked. Em
ployees are paid by shift, and customs and practices
are prevalent throughout the plant pursuant to which
employees are permitted, when the production or
work schedule permits, to leave the work station
early such that some doffing, walking, and washing
will occur prior to the end of their paid shifts.” Deft.
Memo., at 30. USS has set forth affidavit statements
that the time spent on these pre- and post-shift
activities “varied by day and by employee. This is a
personality driven thing. Some guys like to get to
work early and read the paper. Some guys like to
walk slow and chat with friends. It just varies.” Lash
Decl., % 7 [Deft. App. 351].
USS maintains the aggregate amount of time
expended is de minimis. According to the company,
“[t]he variations among employees and units, and
generally the small amounts of time expended pre
and post shift, make each of these activities de
minimis and, thus, non-compensable.” Deft. Memo.,
at 30-31. And while USS didn’t address the last fac
tor, the additional time expended on donning, doffing,
and walking is clearly “regular.”
The plaintiffs argue in response that the de
minimis rule “applies to the aggregate amount of
time for which an employee seeks compensation, not
separately to each discrete activity.” Resp., at 48.
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According to the plaintiffs, donning, doffing, and
walking are all principal activities covered by the
FLSA, so the measurement of time must be in the
aggregate for purposes of the de minimis doctrine —
“work cannot be parsed into discrete activities for
measurement.” Resp., at 48. Plaintiffs say their
position is supported by the DOL’s Wage and Hour
Advisory Memorandum No. 2006-2, dated May 31,
2006, which interprets the decision in IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), as “clearly standing] for
the proposition that where the aggregate time spent
donning, walking, waiting, and doffing exceeds the
de minimis standard, it is compensable. Any other
conclusion would be inconsistent with the continuous
workday rule.” Pltf. Exh. 39, at 4. Plaintiffs have also
offered suggestions of ways USS might better meas
ure the time spent by employees on these activities so
employees could be compensated on a weekly basis
for the time. See Resp., at 50.
The parties seem to agree that the time spent on
these activities varies from person to person and from
activity to activity, but they offer widely differing
estimates as to the amount of time required to com
plete the activities and dispute the feasibility of
measuring that time for purposes of determining the
amount of compensation that might be required.
Questions of fact preclude summary judgment on this
issue.
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D. Mandatory CBA Grievance and Arbitration
Procedures

USS lastly moves for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs’ claims because, the company says, all
disputes arising under the CBA must be resolved
through the procedures set forth in the CBA. USS
says the “Adjustment of Grievances” section of the
2003 CBA provides a specific three-step grievance
procedure that must be employed to settle “any dif
ferences . . . between [USS] and the Union as to the
interpretation or application of, or compliance with,
the provisions of this or any other Agreement be
tween [USS] and the Union.” Deft. App. 111-131.
This same argument was considered and rejected
earlier this year by the court in Andrako v. USS, 632
F. Supp. 2d at 414, and that court’s conclusion is
equally applicable here: “Plaintiffs’ claim for com
pensation for walking time does not rest on an in
terpretation of the underlying collective bargaining
agreement. Rather, plaintiffs argue that regardless of
what the collective bargaining agreement provides,
the FLSA entitles them to compensation for postdonning and pre-doffing walking time as a matter of
law. This is a question of statutory, not contractual,
interpretation.” USS’s request for summary judgment
based on the grievance and arbitration procedures of
the applicable CBA is denied.
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IV.

C o n c l u s io n

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS IN
PART and DENIES IN PART the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment [docket # 82] in the following
particulars:
(a) USS’s request for judgment pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) with respect to plaintiffs’
claim for compensation for donning and doff
ing PPE and showering is GRANTED;
(b) USS’s request for judgment pursu
ant to 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) is
(1) GRANTED with respect to
plaintiffs’ claims related to shower
ing and laundering, and
(2) DENIED with respect to
plaintiffs’ claim related to walking
time;
(c) USS’s request for judgment based
on the de minimis doctrine is DENIED; and
(d) USS’s request for judgment pursu
ant to the grievance and arbitration proce
dures of the applicable CBA is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 15. 2009
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr._______
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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ORDER
On May 22, 2012, plaintiffs-appellees/crossappellants filed a petition for rehearing en banc. All of
the judges on the original panel have voted to deny
the petition, and none of the active judges has re
quested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc.
The petition is therefore DENIED.

